University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Law & Economics Working Papers
4-10-2017

Compensation for Expropriations in a World of Investment
Treaties: Beyond the Lawful/Unlawful Distinction
Steven Ratner

University of Michigan Law School, sratner@umich.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons

Working Paper Citation
Ratner, Steven, "Compensation for Expropriations in a World of Investment Treaties: Beyond the Lawful/
Unlawful Distinction" (2017). Law & Economics Working Papers. 131.
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/131

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law & Economics Working Papers by an authorized administrator
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Ratner:

C OMPENSATION

FOR E XPROPRIATIONS IN A W ORLD OF I NVESTMENT
B EYOND THE L AWFUL /U NLAWFUL D ISTINCTION

T REATIES :

By Steven R. Ratner*
For much of the last century, global actors have sparred over the international legal rules
governing the compensation a state should pay a foreign investor when it expropriates the latter’s
property. The competing claims have had many dimensions, including the content of customary
international law and the line between bona fide regulations and expropriations. In the modern
age of international investment agreements (IIAs), a debate continues over another key issue:
When a state expropriates a foreign investment in violation of an IIA, where should a tribunal
look for the standard of compensation—to the amount the treaty requires the state to pay when it
expropriates, or to an external standard for violations of international law generally? Each is
alluring to a tribunal for its legal visibility—one spelled out in the very text under examination,
and one stemming from a venerable international court case. But they may point to significantly
different results for the investor and the host state. And investor-state tribunals remain wildly
inconsistent, even incoherent, in their choice and use of those standards. It remains a significant
source of disagreement in contemporary investor-state arbitration.1
Today’s debate arises from the basic terms of modern IIAs. They typically ban host states
from expropriating foreign investors unless—or, we might say, permit such expropriations only
if—the state meets four conditions. These treaty conditions are, to simplify, that the taking be (a)
for a public purpose; (b) carried out in a nondiscriminatory manner; (c) in accordance with some
kind of legal process; and (d) accompanied by payment of (usually) full compensation for the
value of the expropriated asset, usually specified as of the date of the expropriation, often with
more details regarding acceptable valuation techniques and interest.2 For the sake of simplicity,
we can call the first three process conditions, as they govern the manner of the expropriation, and
the fourth as a payment condition, as it governs the monetary output of the process. The state can
force a surrender of the property by paying the investor an amount specified by a third party, i.e.,
in the treaty; yet it must follow certain criteria and cannot just pay the investor to waive those
process rights.3 Satisfaction of those four criteria legitimates the transfer, but compensation alone
does not.4
*
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1
See the differences between the majority and dissenting arbitrators in Quiborax v. Bolivia,
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/06/2, Award and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Brigitte Stern
(Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Quiborax].
2
See <8>UNCTAD<8>, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: KEY ISSUES VOLUME I,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/10, 243–46 (2004).
3
These two categories of restrictions in the IIA are similar to liability rules and property
rules in the sense of Calabresi and Melamed, but not quite the same. Both of those rules are
closely associated with court-ordered remedies (compensation in the former, injunction in the
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So now consider these scenarios where states expropriate:
(1) The host state expropriates consistent with all four treaty criteria, in which case the
investor is unlikely to sue under an IIA (and should lose if it does).
(2) The host state expropriates in conformity with the three process conditions, but it does
not pay the investor anything, or at least less than full compensation, which can prompt
investor-state arbitration.
(3) The host state expropriates in conformity with only some of the process conditions, while
also not paying, which can also lead to arbitration.
(4) The host state violates any or all of the process conditions while paying full
compensation, a possibility that could, but probably will not, lead an investor to litigate
over the flawed procedures.
Multiple layers of complexity can be added, including simultaneous violation of other IIA
provisions. And the host state will often deny that it is expropriating at all, in which case the
tribunal will need to make that threshold determination.
The inconsistency and incoherence in the case law arises, then, over whether the
compensation should be based on the formula in the treaty ((d) above)—an internal standard; or
customary international law, in particular that reflected in the International Law Commission’s
Articles on State Responsibility (ASRs)—an external standard. Under the latter, the state, for its
violation of the treaty, must pay full reparation, which may be more than the amount in the
treaty. Tribunals disagree over these options, but do not consider approaches beyond them.
To date, the jurisprudence has been dominated by an anachronistic and analytically
unhelpful distinction between the compensation or damages to be paid for so-called “unlawful
expropriations” and those for so-called “lawful expropriations”—concepts traceable to the
venerable Chorzów Factory case reflexively cited by tribunals.5 Historically, the former has
referred to expropriations that violate certain legal commitments the state has made (in treaties,
or even contracts) and the latter to expropriations that respect those commitments. But the case
law is replete with diverse definitions of the two terms. More important, tribunals disagree on
whether the state expropriating “unlawfully” or “illegally” should have to pay more to the
investor than when it expropriates “lawfully” or “legally”—and in particular whether the former
triggers damages under customary law, whereas the latter leads only to the amount in the treaty.
To return to our four scenarios, tribunals in particular disagree as to whether Scenario 2
or Scenario 3, or both, are “unlawful expropriations” due to the state’s violation of the treaty’s
requirements, whereas Scenario 1 is a “lawful expropriation” because the state has followed the
treaty; and the consequences of that distinction for damages. Among the most significant
latter), whereas the IIA itself specifies the compensation for expropriation and generally
investors do not have the ability to prevent takings by host states. Cf. JOOST PAUWELYN,
OPTIMAL PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: NAVIGATING BETWEEN EUROPEAN ABSOLUTISM
AND AMERICAN VOLUNTARISM 148–50 (2008) (using these terms to describe IIA protections).
4
See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J.
1335, 1348–57 (1986).
5
Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, 1928 PCIJ Rep. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13)
[hereinafter Chorzów Factory].
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decisions to make and monetize the distinction is Yukos v. Russia, a case under the Energy
Charter Treaty that regarded Russia’s seizure of claimants’ shares of the Russian oil giant as
“unlawful” under Scenario 3 (indeed, it found none of the process conditions to be met) and
awarded investors 50 billion dollars.6 Scholars have parsed the case law, but a normative theory
for treating the various scenarios for violations, including any relevance to the lawful/unlawful
distinction, remains elusive.
The fluidity in the law is also part of larger debates over the kinds of state action
international investment agreements should regulate. The political economy of investment law
has shifted from one focused on investor protection—in particular, Northern investment in the
South—to one with greater attention to host state prerogatives (“policy space”), respect for
human rights, and duties on (and not merely rights for) business entities. Consequently, the
characterization of a state’s taking of property and the consequences for the state from alternative
characterizations of the taking assume great importance. How we compensate the investor in the
context of takings will also affect our approach to remedies for other violations of IIAs, where
the treaties are silent. This debate crosses the regimes of international investment law and state
responsibility, raising important questions about the nature of international legal obligations and
the consequences of their breach.
This article, then, attempts to cut through the confusion surrounding the choice of
remedies for expropriations based on standards internal to an IIA or external to it, and the
concomitant lawful/unlawful panacea, and to offer a theoretical framework for determining the
remedies for them. The lawful/unlawful dichotomy—and the assumption that the distinction
maps onto two alternative and exclusive remedies—is antiquated and normatively deficient. It is
a story of tribunals grasping for familiar, but outdated, legal concepts that lack any analytical
punch for determining compensation and that reflect a rigid sort of doctrinal thinking. Indeed,
when IIAs and custom are viewed as a whole, it becomes clear the law does not point to a simple
choice of one internal or external standard. We instead need to develop a new approach by
considering explicitly the purposes of the rules for compensation for expropriation in the context
of the contemporary foreign investment process.
I develop this thesis as follows. Part I looks back to the origin of the current doctrinal
muddle, namely the multiple understandings attached to, and consequences of, “lawful” and
“unlawful” expropriations. Part II provides the normative framework for analyzing various
doctrinal approaches, setting forth five generally accepted goals for any remedies for
expropriation. Part III examines the principal alternatives for determining damages in the event
of treaty-violative expropriations and how each fares in terms of advancing the goals for
remedies. Part IV then takes my preferred position for a new approach—one that keys the
remedies to the nature of the expropriatory act vis-à-vis the four criteria in investment treaties—
and considers its implications for damages. Part V considers the possibility of extending this
framework to remedies for other IIA violations. I conclude with a few observations about the
implications of my approach for the relationship between host state obligations and remedies in
international investment law more generally.
Finally, a word on the scope of this study: The question of internal versus external
standards for compensation is one of a number of issues facing the international law of
6

See Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Fed’n, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA Case No. AA 227
(July 18, 2014), set aside, Russian Fed’n v. Veteran Petroleum Ltd., Yukos Universal Ltd., and
Hulley Enterprises Ltd., Hague Dist. Ct. (Apr. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Yukos].
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expropriation. To keep the focus on this issue, I will need to bracket other issues, already the
subject of significant scholarship, including the contours of the law on indirect expropriation
(regulatory takings), the possibility of a lesser payment to the investor after large-scale
expropriations, the deference due to local procedures for providing compensation, and the types
of property that may or may not be subject to expropriation.
I.

A LOOK BACK AT A CONFOUNDING DISTINCTION

The current state of the case law originates in, and still cites with regularity, a line of
cases that emphasized the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriations. Those cases
are often cited by advocates, invoked by courts, or endorsed by scholars, many times with little
appreciation of the different meanings the two key terms assumed over time.
A. The Pre-IIA Era
1. From Chorzów Factory to the Oil Expropriation Cases
If we had to assign a birth date to the lawful/unlawful distinction, it would probably be
September 13, 1928, when the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) issued its ruling
on the indemnity Poland had to pay to Germany for the former’s seizure of the German-owned
nitrate plant in Upper Silesia in the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów. That case has long
stood for an authoritative pronouncement of the basic duty on a state that breaches its legal duties
to provided full reparation—more specifically, for a remedy that serves to “wipe out all the
consequences” of the breach—a position endorsed in the ILC’s ASRs. But it has also generated
countless citations for its passages that attempt to: (a) define, and set up the distinction between,
lawful and unlawful expropriations; and (b) quantify that difference through a series of
instructions by the judges to outside experts regarding the calculation of damages.
The PCIJ had already determined in 1926 that Poland’s seizure of the German-owned
factory violated the 1922 Geneva Convention Concerning Upper Silesia that prohibited most
taking of foreign property.7 Indeed, in that phase of the case, it interpreted the Convention to the
effect that if a taking were not in conformity with Articles 6–24 of that treaty, “expropriation is
unlawful.”8 In 1928, as it turned to the question of damages, it characterized that violation as
follows:
The action of Poland . . . contrary to the Geneva Convention is not an expropriation—to
render which lawful only the payment of fair compensation would have been wanting; it
is a seizure of property . . . which could not be expropriated even against compensation,
save under the exceptional conditions fixed by Article 7 of the said Convention [i.e., with
the permission of a mixed commission for the first fifteen years]. . . . [R]eparation is in
this case the consequence not of the application of Articles 6 to 22 of the Geneva
Convention, but of acts contrary to those articles.9
7

Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 PCIJ Rep. (ser. A) No.
7 (May 25).
8
Id. at 21.
9
Chorzów Factory, supra note 5, at 46.
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In the next two paragraphs, it reiterated the distinction between a “lawful liquidation” and an
“unlawful dispossession” or “illegal act.” Thus, the central defining feature of the unlawful
expropriation of the factory was that Poland violated the Geneva Convention, as previously
determined by the Court. If Poland had taken over foreign property according to the terms of the
treaty, it would have been a lawful expropriation.
For the PCIJ, this distinction had direct consequences for the damages due Germany. In
its key holding, it said:
[T]he compensation due to the German Government is not necessarily limited to the
value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession, plus interest to the day of
payment. This limitation would only be admissible if the Polish Government had had the
right to expropriate, and if its wrongful act consisted merely in not having paid to the two
Companies the just price of what was expropriated; in the present case, such a limitation
might result in placing Germany and the interests protected by the Geneva Convention . .
. in a situation more unfavourable than that in which Germany and these interests would
have been if Poland had respected the said Convention. Such a consequence would not
only be unjust, but . . . incompatible with the aim of the . . . Convention—that is to say,
the prohibition, in principle, of the liquidation of the property . . . of German nationals
and . . . companies . . . in Upper Silesia—since it would be tantamount to rendering
lawful liquidation and unlawful dispossession indistinguishable in so far as their financial
results are concerned.10
One should notice three core points from this passage. First, the Court seems to posit that
the amount due Germany for a lawful expropriation was the “value of the undertaking at the
moment of dispossession” (plus interest), which it calls the “just price of what was
expropriated.” I will call that value FVDE, for “full value on the date of expropriation.”11 Second,
the Court is adamant that, as a matter of justice, the unlawful expropriation must be compensated
at a higher level than the lawful compensation. Third, and somewhat confusingly, the Court
suggests that if Poland’s “wrongful act” had merely been nonpayment of the value at the moment
of the taking, that amount would be all that was due—even though it would seem that a denial of
payment is wrongful as well.
From this starting point, the Court then developed its famous holding that a remedy for
unlawful acts must “wipe out all the consequences” of them.12 It then instructed experts to
quantify this amount, though its instructions reflected antiquated understandings of the value of
an asset—with physical and other committed assets (damnum emergens) and lost profits (lucrum
cessans) separated out. It offered two valuation options that have flummoxed arbitrators,
academics, and valuation experts ever since—(a) one that seems based on the sum of FVDE (or
maybe just the damnum emergens) plus profits from the date of expropriation to the date of the
award; and (b) another based on the value of the undertaking (or again, maybe just the damnum
10

Id. at 47.
I leave aside for now whether that full value is based solely on information at the time of
the expropriation or information that later became available. In any case, it should not reflect any
change in value due to knowledge of the expropriation before it actually occurred.
12
Chorzów Factory, supra note 5, at 47.
11
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emergens) at the time of the award.13 The Court never directly explained exactly how its “wipe
out all the consequences” standard would provide a different level of compensation from the
“value of the undertaking at the moment of dispossession,” though, as discussed below, some
read it to imply that the two formulas offered above can result in a higher award for the latter
than the former.14
The major arbitrations concerning the nationalizations of Western oil interests in the
Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s invoked Chorzów Factory’s distinction between lawful and
unlawful expropriations. In BP Exploration v. Libya (1973), where no treaty governed Libya’s
treatment of foreign investment, the sole arbitrator, Gunnar Lagergren, was careful to distinguish
Chorzów Factory as a case concerned solely with expropriations in violation of treaties.15 He
referred to Libya’s expropriation as a “wrongful act” by virtue of its breach of the concession
agreement, but not as a wrongful or unlawful expropriation.16 As a result, he rejected BP’s
claims that it was entitled to full enjoyment of its rights under the concession. The parties settled
before an award on damages was issued.
However, four years later, in Texas Overseas Petroleum Company (TOPCO) v. Libya
(1977), arbitrator René-Jean Dupuy found that the claimant’s contract with Libya was an
“internationalized contract,” and that Libya breached its duty under both Libyan and
international law (both of which governed the concession agreement) to perform it.17 Dupuy
turned to Chorzów Factory, other cases, and scholars, and ruled that the proper remedy for an
“unlawful act” was nothing less than restitutio in integrum—full performance of the contracts it
had breached.18 That rather audacious ruling has not been followed in an expropriation case
since.19 In relying on remedies for an unlawful act, Dupuy thus suggested that an expropriation
could be unlawful as a matter of customary international law merely if it violated a contract
between the host state and the foreign investor.20
In two other leading cases, Libyan American Oil Company v. Libya (1977) and Kuwait v.
American Independent Oil Company (1982), the arbitrators also distinguished between lawful
and unlawful expropriations, in both cases rejecting the characterization of the respondent state’s
act as unlawful and adopting a damages formula that they claimed reflected the investors’

13

Id. at 51–52.
For a charitable interpretation, see Manuel A. Abdala & Pablo T. Spiller, Chorzów’s
Standard Rejuvenated: Assessing Damages in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 25 J. INT’L ARB.
103, 105–08 (2008).
15
BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Libyan Arab Rep., 53 ILR 297, 337–40 (1973).
16
Id. at 329, 355.
17
Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. (<8>TOPCO<8>) v. Libyan Arab Rep., 17 ILM 1, paras.
93–109 (1977).
18
Id., para. 103; see also id., paras. 97–109, dispositif.
19
See Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in
International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 321 (1982) (favoring restitution in principle but
finding “very little evidence that [it] is perceived as a required remedy or that it is anticipated as
being likely to be granted.”).
20
For academic endorsement of an unlawful taking as one violating a concession agreement,
see C.F. Amerasinghe, Issues of Compensation for the Taking of Alien Property in the Light of
Recent Cases and Practice, 41 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 22, 37 (1992).
14

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/131

6

Ratner:

7
expectations.21 So while the distinction developed between the two sorts of characterizations
remained, the one suggested by Dupuy in TOPCO remained the outlier.
2. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Other than Chorzów Factory, the most significant case law addressing lawful/unlawful
expropriations took place in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in cases still cited by counsel and
tribunals. The Tribunal was charged under the 1981 Algiers Accords with adjudicating claims of
“expropriations or other measures affecting property rights”; the law for determining those
claims included the U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of
1955.22 The context for addressing the distinction was Iran’s argument in many cases that if a
state engaged in a lawful expropriation—which it insisted was the correct characterization of its
acts against U.S. companies—it need not pay full value (even FVDE) to the investor, but rather
significantly less or even nothing at all. 23 Two cases demonstrate the allure of Chorzów
Factory’s distinctions to the tribunal.
In INA v. Iran (1985), the Tribunal addressed the claim of an American insurance
company for the expropriation of its Iranian subsidiary. The panel noted that
expropriations for a public purpose and subject to conditions provided for by law—
notably that category which can be characterised as ‘nationalisations’—are not per se
unlawful. A lawful nationalisation will, however, impose on the government concerned
the obligation to pay compensation.24
It did not, however, explain the connection between a breach of the Treaty of Amity and an
unlawful expropriation. While the Tribunal admitted that a full-scale nationalization might not
require full compensation, both treaty and custom demanded it in the case of the small-scale
taking of INA (which it suggested, but did not actually say, was lawful). In separate opinions,

21

Libyan Am. Oil Co. (Liamco) v. Libya, 20 ILM 1, 59, 61, 76–77 (1981); State of Kuwait
v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 ILM 976, 1024, paras. 102, 104; 1025, paras. 109–110; 1031, para.
138; 1034, paras. 148–49 (1982).
22
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Art. II, Jan. 19, 1981; Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 284 UNTS 93. Article 4(2)
of the latter provides that property of nationals of each state “shall not be taken except for a
public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation.”
23
See Martin J. Valasek, A “Simple Scheme”: Exploring the Meaning of Chorzów Factory
for the Valuation of Opportunistic Expropriation in the BIT Generation, 4 TDM 6, 42 (2007);
see generally Matti Pellonpää, Compensable Claims Before the Tribunal: Expropriation Claims,
in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 185, 198–217 (Richard B. Lillich & Daniel Barstow Magraw eds., 1998).
24
INA Corp. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case No. 161, 8 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 373, 378
(Aug. 12, 1985).
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three arbitrators discussed the different levels of compensation for lawful versus unlawful
takings.25
The most extended discussion of the issue took place in Amoco International Finance
(AIF) v. Iran (1987), concerning Iran’s seizure of AIF’s 50 percent interest in Khemco, which
produced natural gas and related products.26 Of all the Tribunal’s cases, this one still garners the
most attention on the internal/external standard for compensation and lawful/unlawful
distinction. The Tribunal applied the Treaty of Amity to Iran’s acts, in each case finding no
violation and concluding it was not unlawful for those reasons.27 Thus the Tribunal made a clear
linkage between illegality and breach of a treaty.28 The conclusion that the expropriation was
lawful proved critical for the Tribunal’s views on the source of the standard for compensation:
Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty determines the conditions that an expropriation
should meet in order to be in conformity with its terms and therefore defines the standard
of compensation only in case of a lawful expropriation. A nationalization in breach of the
Treaty, on the other hand, would render applicable the rules relating to State
responsibility, which are to be found not in the Treaty but in customary law.29
Even though the Tribunal had found the expropriation lawful, it turned to Chorzów
Factory as “also illuminating.”30 It then reinterpreted the questions that the PCIJ had put to the
experts to elaborate on the difference between the damages for a lawful expropriation compared
to an unlawful one. In a ruling that seemed to lack much understanding of valuation methods, it
concluded that lost profits were to be included as damages only for unlawful expropriations, and

25

Id. at 385–90 (Lagergren, sep. op.) (calling discriminatory expropriations “inherently
unlawful” and entitling investor to damages “as closely as possible in monetary terms to . . .
restitutio in integrum,” while large-scale nationalizations may call for less than full
compensation); id. at 393–401 (Holtzmann, sep. op.) (disagreeing with Lagergren’s latter
proposition); id. at 411 (Ameli, dissenting) (unlawful measures involving breach “of its
international obligations” including “its contractual obligations,” may allow for restitutio in
integrum). See also Sedco v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. and the Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case No. 129, 10
Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 180, 187 (Mar. 27, 1986) (full value applies to a “discrete
expropriation of alien property,” “whether or not the expropriation itself was otherwise lawful”)
[hereinafter Sedco].
26
Amoco Int’l Fin. Corp. (AIF) v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case. No. 56, 15 Iran-U.S. Claims
Trib. Rep. 189 (July 14, 1987) [hereinafter AIF].
27
Id. at 234, para. 147.
28
It further found the breach of the contract by AIF’s Iranian partner was not an unlawful act
by Iran because Iran was not party to the contract, concluding that AIF’s interests were “lawfully
expropriated by Iran.” This second finding suggests indirectly that illegality can arise from a
breach of contract as well. Id. at 244, para. 182.
29
Id. at 246, para. 189.
30
Id. at 247, para. 195.
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seemed to rule out discounted cash flow (DCF) as a method of valuation. Yet it then went ahead
and applied a DCF evaluation after all.31
That dicta elicited a lengthy concurring opinion from Judge Brower. He accepted the idea
of a distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation, but offered a different interpretation
of Chorzów Factory:
If an expropriation is lawful, the deprived party is to be awarded damages equal to “the
value of the undertaking” which it has lost, including any potential future profits, as of
the date of taking; in the case of an unlawful taking, however, either the injured party is
to be actually restored to enjoyment of his property, or, should this be impossible or
impractical, he is to be awarded damages equal to the greater of (i) the value of the
undertaking at the date of loss (again including lost profits), judged on the basis of
information available as of that date, and (ii) its value (likewise including lost profits) as
shown by its probable performance subsequent to the date of loss and prior to the date of
the award, based on actual post-taking experience, plus (in either alternative) any
consequential damages. Apart from the fact that this is what Chorzów Factory says, it is
the only set of principles that will guarantee just compensation . . . .32
Both the majority and the concurrence thus resurrected Chorzów Factory’s distinction
between lawful and unlawful expropriations, and agreed that it affected the amount to be paid the
investor, even though the majority thought it was only about whether to include lost profits.
Brower’s innovation was to read Chorzów Factory to mean that the target of the unlawful
expropriation could choose the date of valuation. The investor could pick the larger of :(a) the
FVDE, as valued according to modern DCF techniques, and thus not limited to damnum
emergens; and (b) the full value on the date of the award—which I will call FVDA—again as
valued according to modern DCF techniques.33
Scholars and arbitrators have spilled much ink on whether the majority or Judge Brower
interpreted Chorzów Factory correctly.34 I will not go down that route because, in the end, that
exercise involves an interpretation of a part of the PCIJ judgment based on an anachronistic
method of valuation, one that separated out damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, rather than
modern financial terms.35 Chorzów Factory’s valuation formulas reached their expiration date
decades ago.
The pre-IIA era thus left a legacy of doctrinal messiness. Tribunals seized on the
lawful/unlawful distinction but disagreed on: (a) the criteria for illegality (e.g., breach of a
31

Id. at 248–52, paras. 197–206; 258–64, paras. 227–46. For excellent critiques, see William
C. Lieblich, Determinations by International Tribunals of the Economic Value of Expropriated
Enterprises, 7 J. INT’L ARB. 37, 57–67 (1990); Valasek, supra note 23, at 16–20.
32
AIF, supra note 26, at 300–01, para. 18 (Brower, concurring).
33
The Tribunal elaborated a bit on the distinction a few years later, holding that even lawful
expropriations required payment of full value, while unlawful expropriations might require either
restitution or payment for “any increase in the value of the property between the date of taking
and the date of the [award].” Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case No. 39, 21
Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 79, 122, para. 110 (June 29, 1989).
34
For a recent example, see the competing opinions in Quiborax, supra note 1.
35
I elaborate on this point in Part IV.A below.
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contract, breach of a treaty, or other factors like discriminatory conduct); and (b) the
consequences for damages, e.g., whether one or the other entitled the investor to restitutio in
integrum, FVDA, FVDE, or even something much less.
B. Enter the IIA Era
One might have thought that tribunals adjudicating IIA claims could shed references to
lawful or unlawful expropriations. Those meeting the criteria in the treaty would either not lead
to litigation or not lead to any liability; and expropriations in violation of the treaty would be
identified as treaty violations first and foremost. The remedy for those violations might be a
based on a lex specialis for investment law (even in the treaty itself) or on the fallback position
of customary law, but the lodestar of the analysis would be that the treaty had been violated.36
Yet counsel to investor-state disputes and many tribunals still deploy the distinction
terminologically and substantively. The range of tribunal views, and the diversity of investments
valued in current arbitrations, makes each case unique and grouping them somewhat difficult.37
Moreover, we can never be certain whether the stated position of the tribunal is actually doing
any work in arriving at the final damages number given the mystery involved in those figures.
Nonetheless, four basic positions seem to have emerged:38
Group 1—Compensation Based on Treaty Formula, Silence on the Lawful/Unlawful
Distinction: Numerous IIA cases have found that the state expropriated the claimant’s
investment in violation of an IIA and yet did not rely on any distinction between lawful and
unlawful expropriations in their award of damages. The tribunals avoided addressing the
distinction and turned to the treaty standard of FVDE as the basis for damages. These include:
Metalclad v. Mexico (2000);39 Wena Hotels v. Egypt (2000);40 Middle East Cement v. Egypt
(2002); 41 Tecmed v. Mexico (2004); 42 Rumeli Telekom v. Kazakhstan (2008); 43 Sistem
Muhendislik Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret v. Kyrgyz Republic (2009);44 Occidental Petroleum v.
Ecuador (2012); 45 Abengoa y Cofides v. Mexico (2013);46 SAUR v. Argentina (2014);47 and
Tenaris and Talta-Trading E Marketing v. Venezuela (2016).48
36

Arbitrations whose governing law was customary international law or a state’s domestic
law would still need to adopt the distinction.
37
See Meg Kinnear, Damages in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 551, 559–60 (Katia
Yannaca-Small ed., 2010).
38
Unless otherwise noted, the treaty standard in all of the cases discussed here was the FVDE,
so differences in treaty language do not account for the different approaches to remedies.
39
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para. 118 (Aug. 30, 2000).
40
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/98/4, para. 118 (Dec. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Wena Hotels].
41
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/99/6, paras. 144, 146 (Apr. 12, 2002).
42
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, paras. 151, 187–88 (May 29, 2003).
43
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/16, para. 785 (July 29, 2008) [hereinafter Rumeli
Telekom].
44
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/06/1, paras. 121, 156, 159 (Sept. 9, 2009).
45
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/06/11, para. 707 (Oct. 5, 2012).
46
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/09/2, para. 681 (Apr. 18, 2013).
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Group 2—Lawful/Unlawful Distinction Noted, but Damages the Same as a Legal Matter: In
other cases, tribunals noted the distinction but found that it did not, as a matter of law, have
an effect on damages. In general, these cases found the customary international law standard
to be the same as the treaty standard and awarded FVDE. Notable among these are: CME v.
Czech Republic (2001–03);49 Gemplus and Talsud v. Mexico (2010);50 Unglaube v. Costa
Rica (2012);51 Guaracachi v. Bolivia (2014);52 British Caribbean Bank v. Belize (2014);53
and Rusoro Mining v. Venezuela.54
Group 3—Lawful/Unlawful Distinction Noted, but Treaty Formula Used Due to Special
Facts: In a third set of cases, tribunals accepted that lawful versus unlawful expropriations
would produce different damages; but they did not rely on the distinction in the award due to
the specific traits of the investment. Key cases include: Funnekotter v. Zimbabwe (2009);55
Siag and Vecchi v. Egypt (2009);56 Kardassopoulos v. Georgia (2010);57 Houben v. Burundi
(2016);58 Crystallex International v. Venezuela;59 and Vestey Group v. Venezuela.60

47

<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/04/4, para. 85 (Mar. 22, 2014). See also Alpha
Projektholding v. Ukraine, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/07/16, paras. 481–93 (Nov. 8, 2010);
Goetz v. Burundi, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/01/2, para. 295 (June 21, 2012) (both endorsing
FVDE without mention of a treaty standard); Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, <8>ICSID<8> Case No.
ARB/96/1, paras. 78–84 (Feb. 17, 2000) (endorsing FVDE but no IIA governing dispute).
48
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/11/26, paras. 512–17 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Tenaris].
49
<8>UNCITRAL<8>, Partial Award, paras. 615–16 (Sept. 13, 2001); Final Award, paras.
494–508 (Mar. 14, 2003) (treaty standard of “just compensation” is amount under customary
law, which was FVDE).
50
<8>ICSID<8> Case Nos. ARB(AF)/04/3 and 04/4, paras. 8-25, 12-43, 12-53, 13-93 (June
16, 2010) (treaty standard a “useful guide” for compensation for unlawful expropriations and
investment valued as of date of expropriation) [hereinafter Unglaube].
51
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/08/1, paras. 305–18 (May 16, 2012) (treaty and custom
generally require valuation of asset at highest fair market value).
52
<8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA Case No. 2011-17, paras. 441, 443–44, 613–14 (Jan. 31, 2014)
(hinting that FVDA might apply in principle).
53
<8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA Case No. 2010-18, paras. 241, 260–61 (Dec. 19, 2014) (BIT’s
standard of FVDE a lex specialis regardless of whether expropriation was lawful or unlawful, but
awarding no expropriation damages based on absence of evidence from claimant) [hereinafter
British Caribbean Bank]. For two cases where the tribunal called the expropriation illegal but
relied on the treaty without explanation, see OI European Grp. v. Venezuela, <8>ICSID<8> Case
No. ARB/11/25, paras. 426, 647 (Mar. 10, 2015); Flughafen Zurich v. Venezuela, <8>ICSID<8>
Case No. ARB/10/19, paras. 744–47 (Nov. 18, 2014).
54
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5, paras. 639–40, 646 (Aug. 22, 2016).
55
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/6, paras. 108–23 (Apr. 22, 2009) (using treaty standard
of “genuine value,” interpreted to be FVDE, because investment had not appreciated since its
taking).
56
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/15, paras. 443, 539–41 (June 1, 2009) (using FVDE
because investors not seeking loss of profits per se) [hereinafter Siag & Vecchi].
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Group 4—Lawful/Unlawful Distinction Noted, with an Effect on Damages: Finally, in a
relatively small number of cases, the tribunal has both made a distinction between the two
types of takings and used that distinction as the lodestar for determining damages. The seven
cases are: ADC v. Hungary (2006); 61 Siemens v. Argentina (2007); 62 ConocoPhillips v.
Venezuela (2013);63 Yukos Universal v. Russia (2014);64 Venezuela Holdings v. Venezuela
(2014);65 Tidewater v. Venezuela (2015);66 and Quiborax v. Bolivia (2015).67 Of the seven

57

<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/18, paras. 514–17 (Mar. 3, 2010) (applying treaty
standard of FVDE on the grounds that claimants would have sold their business at that time).
58
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/13/7, paras. 219–26, 236–39 (Jan. 12, 2016) (using FVDE
because claimant could not prove consequential damages or an increase in value of the
investment).
59
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, paras. 841-53 (Apr. 4, 2016) (applying FVDE
because parties agree on valuation date).
60
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/06/4, paras. 329–31, 350, 437–40 (Apr. 15, 2016) (applying
FVDE because parties agree on valuation date) [hereinafter Vestey].
61
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/03/16, paras. 426–44, 481, 483–99 (Oct. 2, 2006) (finding
BIT violation an “unlawful expropriation,” applying Chorzów Factory, and calculating damages
based on FVDA) [hereinafter ADC]. On the difference in the award from using FVDA, see
Valasek, supra note 23.
62
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/02/8, paras. 349, 352, 360 (Feb. 6, 2007) (breach of BIT
renders expropriation “unlawful,” requiring payment of FVDA plus consequential damages, but
basing FVDA on book value as of date of expropriation) [hereinafter Siemens].
63
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/07/30, paras. 342–43, 362, 401 (Sept. 3, 2013) (BIT’s
compensation criterion requires only that host state negotiate with investor in good faith over
compensation, but concluding that Venezuela had failed to do so, leading to an unlawful
expropriation and damages based on FVDA) [hereinafter ConocoPhillips]. The tribunal has not
issued an award on the quantum due to attempts by Venezuela to remove two arbitrators.
64
Yukos, supra note 6, paras. 1581–85, 1758–69, 1826–27 (breach of Energy Charter Treaty
an “unlawful expropriation,” triggering Chorzów Factory and the Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, and allowing claimant to choose between FVDE and
FVDA).
65
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB 07/27, paras. 301–06 (Oct. 9, 2014) (expropriation did not
violate BIT requirement of “just compensation” because state had made a serious proposal to the
investor for compensation, and awarding FVDE, also specified in the BIT); annulled, Mar. 9,
2017 [hereinafter Venezuela Holdings].
66
<8>ICSID<8> Case. No. ARB/10/5, paras. 140–46, 159–63 (Mar. 13, 2015) (holding that
“an expropriation only wanting fair compensation has to be considered as a provisionally lawful
expropriation,” which was the case here because Venezuelan law required state to pay investor
only book value, and calculating damages based on BIT’s standard of FVDE) [hereinafter
Tidewater].
67
Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 240–55, 325–30, 343–47, 370–85 (BIT violation triggers
remedy under Chorzów Factory and the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, interpreted as FVDA).
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cases, the tribunal found the action unlawful in five cases—ADC, Siemens, ConocoPhillips,
Yukos, and Quiborax—and lawful in two—Venezuela Holdings and Tidewater.
The modern IIA cases thus evidence a significant range of approaches to the use of
internal versus external standards regarding compensation for expropriation and the relevance of
the lawful/unlawful distinction. Nonetheless, most tribunals distinguish between a lawful and
unlawful expropriation, and those tribunals doing so equate “unlawful” with an expropriation in
violation of the IIA’s criteria. The other uses suggested in the earlier case law (e.g., a violation of
custom, or a contract) have faded. Still, most tribunals are awarding the treaty formula of FVDE
for expropriations in violation of the IIA—either without explanation (Group 1); because they
believe that that amount is also the amount due for an expropriation in violation of the treaty
(Group 2); or because the facts of the case make FVDE the most sensible award level, in
particular because the asset has not increased in value since the taking (Group 3).68 Only three
cases—ADC, Yukos, and Quiborax—have used the distinction to award a higher degree of
damages than FVDE, i.e., FVDA or something like it.69
One important wrinkle in these cases is that when tribunals purport to apply FVDE, they
are not consistent in whether they are using only information available at the date of the
expropriation or information that has become available since that time, in particular when they
are calculating the DCF of the investment.70 Though DCFs based on both available and ex post
information are still discounted back to the date of expropriation in calculating FVDE, those
numbers can differ if market conditions change unpredictably after the expropriation. Full value
on the date of expropriation using ex post information has been endorsed as early as Amco Asia
v. Indonesia 71 (which did not concern an IIA) and as recently at Quiborax. 72 Both cases
considered that amount to be the quantum of damages required for unlawful acts as a matter of
customary international law. However, sometimes tribunals seem to rely on ex ante information
for some inputs and ex post information for other inputs into FVDE.73 Academic and other

68

I appreciate Charles Brower’s point in this regard. See also the summary of the case law in
<8>UNCTAD<8>, EXPROPRIATION: A SEQUEL, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, at 114–16 (2011).
69
See Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 54–56 (Stern, dissenting). As noted, an award on
quantum has not been issued in ConocoPhillips. In Tenaris, supra note 48, paras. 542–49, the
tribunal suggested that part of its valuation of certain side companies was based on Chorzów
Factory and not merely the treaty.
70
DCF is not always used, whether because an asset is no longer performing or because a
tribunal regards data on cash flow as too contingent, in which case other methods to determine
fair market value (e.g., share prices) are used.
71
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/81/1, paras. 613–14 (Nov. 20, 1984) [hereinafter Amco
Asia].
72
Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 379–85. For other examples, see Christina L. Beharry,
Lawful Versus Unlawful Expropriation: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose, in INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (Ian A. Laird, Borzu Sabahi, Frédéric G. Sourgens
& Todd J. Weiler eds., 2016).
73
See Quiborax, supra note 1, (Stern, dissenting).
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commentaries differ on whether ex post information can be considered for purposes of
determining FVDE.74 I will return to this point in Part III.A.
C. European Court of Human Rights
A number of IIA tribunals have supported their distinctions between lawful and unlawful
expropriations, with the consequences for damages, by reference to European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence. The precedent sometimes cited is Papamichalopoulos v. Greece
(1995), where the Court, having previously found that the Greek military government’s taking of
the applicant’s beachfront property was a violation of Protocol I, labeled the dispossession
“unlawful.” It then invoked Chorzów Factory and ordered Greece either to provide restitution or
to pay the current value of the land and buildings (i.e., the FVDA), as well as nonpecuniary
damages for mental suffering.75
However, in Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy (2009), the Court, via the Grand Chamber, changed
course significantly, ruling that when the state had definitively taken a claimant’s property in the
public interest such that she no longer had title to it, it need only pay the value as of the date of
the expropriation (plus interest).76 The ruling suggested that some expropriations that violate
Protocol I are worse than others, though it is hard to see how exactly it fits into the
lawful/unlawful distinction. 77 Investment tribunals do not, however, seem to have made
reference to this case.78
D. A Brief Word on Academic Commentary
Contemporary academic treatments still make reference to the lawful/unlawful distinction
as key to the determination of damages. Thus, the Dolzer/Schreuer volume and de Nanteuil’s
recent treatise restate the four criteria above as rules of customary international law, qualify any
74

Compare IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 237 (2009) and William C. Lieblich, Determining the
Economic Value of Expropriated Income-Producing Property in International Arbitrations, 8 J.
INT’L ARB. 59, 72 (1991) with Abdala & Spiller, supra note 14, at 109–18.
75
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece (Article 50), App. No. 14556/89, 21 EHRR 439, paras. 36–
40 (1996). For cases citing it, see, e.g., Tidewater, supra note 66, at n. 218, and ADC, supra note
61, para. 497. The European Court of Human Rights has cited the case in some judgments under
Protocol I—particularly those involving land or other physical assets—for the proposition that
the state must provide restitution, or, failing that, FVDA plus nonpecuniary damages. Velcheva v.
Bulgaria, App. No. 35355/08, [2015] ECHR 552, para. 56 (2015); Borzhonov v. Russia, App.
No. 1827/04, ECHR, para. 69 (2009); Brumarescu v. Romania, App. No. 28342/95, [1999]
ECHR 105, para. 20 (2001).
76
Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy (Just Satisfaction), App. No. 58858/00, ECHR, paras. 102–07
(2009).
77
See OCTAVIAN ICHIM, JUST SATISFACTION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 102–05 (2014). Unlike Ichim, I interpret Guiso-Gallisay as restoring somewhat the
distinctions among expropriations based on the way they are carried out.
78
It is not listed as an ECHR case cited by tribunals in the www.investorstatelawguide.com
database, as of publication date.
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violation of those standards as an illegal expropriation, and call for recourse to the rules of state
responsibility for such acts, which may lead to damages different from the value of the asset at
the time of the taking.79 Both the latter and Marboe’s impressive book also distinguish between
compensation for a lawful expropriation with damages (indemnisation) for an unlawful act.80
Sornorajah agrees that takings must be for a public purpose and nondiscriminatory to be legal,
but he does not seem to consider the mere nonpayment of compensation—even in violation of a
treaty—to render the expropriation unlawful; and he calls for payment in those cases to be the
amount in the treaty.81
E. Crystallizing the Shortcomings in the Case Law
This overview reveals contrasting understandings as to what makes an expropriation legal
or illegal as well as a multiplicity of approaches to the damages that follow. For some tribunals,
the distinction is not mentioned. For scholars and tribunals that do note it, an expropriation could
be unlawful due to a breach of a contract, local law, customary law, or an IIA (the usage most
common among tribunals today). If it is unlawful, the remedy still might be based on the
standard in the treaty, i.e., FVDE, or on customary international law. If it is the customary law
standard, it might mean FVDA, FVDE, or something else, which may or may not incorporate
information not known at the time of the expropriation.
The practice and case law makes clear that every expropriation differs in terms of the
method used and the impact on the investor; and every investment differs in terms of the best
economic way of valuing it.82 And not all treaties use identical language to describe the required
compensation, although the use of FVDE is overall quite consistent. The problem for the law is
that this diversity of expropriations does not map onto the diversity of legal approaches to
remedies. There is no fit between the often-irreconcilable principles in the case law and the
actions of the states, including their impact on foreign investors. The combination of

79

RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 99–100 (2d ed. 2012); ARNAUD DE NANTEUIL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE
L’INVESTISSEMENT 342–47 (2014)
80
See DE NANTEUIL, supra note 79, at 347–48; MARBOE, supra note 74, at 75–79. I will use
the terms interchangeably in this piece. See also SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS,
DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 66, 86–88 (2008). For an argument that the BIT
standard is close to that of customary law for unlawful takings, see Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral
Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS 251,
396 (1997).
81
MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNORAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
406–10 (3d ed. 2010). See also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 624–25 (8th ed. 2012) (finding most expropriations “unlawful only. . . if
appropriate compensation is not provided for,” but some (e.g., discriminatory takings) unlawful
per se, but then endorsing AIF’s, supra note 26, economically flawed view on damage
calculations).
82
See Henry Weisberg & Christopher Ryan, Means to Be Made Whole: Damages in the
Context of International Investment Arbitration, in EVALUATION OF DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 165, 169–70 (Yves Derains & Richard H. Kreindler eds., 2006).
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inconsistency and conceptual lack of clarity means that the case law does not provide legal
guidance to participants in the foreign investment process.
The current approaches to remedies thus have a terminological and a substantive element.
As a terminological matter, Chorzów Factory (and, to a lesser extent, the competing opinions in
Amoco International Finance) still exerts a pull on some tribunals to characterize expropriations
as lawful or unlawful, even if they do not use that distinction to determine damages. Tribunals
seem to use the terms out of a sense of inertia, even though the only questions typically before a
tribunal are: (a) whether an expropriation has taken place; (b) whether it met the criteria in the
IIA; and (c) if not, the amount due for the treaty violation.
The terminological confusion has a fairly simple solution. Tribunals deciding
expropriation claims under IIAs should describe expropriations as either treaty-compliant or
treaty-violative. Whether the expropriation is unlawful in any other sense is not relevant for its
consistency with the expropriation requirements of an IIA (except possibly to the extent that
interpretation of some of the process conditions for expropriation may take account of customary
international law). This terminology will avoid the incoherence of saying, for instance, that a
violation of any of the first three (process-based) criteria of an IIA is an unlawful act while a
violation of the fourth (payment) criterion alone is a lawful act.
Many tribunals use the term unlawful in this narrow sense of a treaty violation, so the
term could be salvaged. But the alternative will also dispel misgivings by developing states that
international law somehow questions their sovereign right to expropriate.83 By avoiding the
moniker of “unlawful” in favor of treaty-violative, tribunals will be sending a clearer message
that the state’s right to expropriate is not at issue, but only whether the exercise of that right was
conformity with treaties to which it is a party.84
But a terminological fix will not solve the more fundamental disagreement over the
proper remedy for a violation of the criteria for a treaty-compliant expropriation. That dispute
raises questions such as whether some violations of IIAs are worse than others; whether IIAs
provide a lex specialis for remedies and thus the scope of the default rules of state responsibility;
and how we ought best to monetize the damages for an expropriation.
II.

A FRAMEWORK FOR DEVISING REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

A. Doctrinal Constraints?
International law does not offer one obvious doctrinal solution to the problem presented
here. Certainly, as a matter of customary international law, a breach of a legal obligation triggers
duties by the violator, which the ASRs have identified as including cessation and nonrepetition,
along with full reparation. The ASRs define the latter as restitution if possible (and not an undue

83

A right that is beyond question. See, e.g., GA Res. 1803 (XVII) (Dec. 14, 1962).
The terminology might have relevance in situations not covered by an investment treaty,
e.g., where the investor or its home state bases its claims on custom (perhaps if an insurance
contract only covers unlawful expropriations); or in interpreting other clauses of IIAs, e.g., an
umbrella clause (where illegality for breach of a contract can be a treaty violation) or fair and
equitable treatment (where the tribunal may have recourse to customary international law).
84
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burden on the violating state) or, otherwise, compensation “for the damage caused” (meaning
“financially assessable damage including loss of profits”).85
But the ASRs do not provide enough guidance for investor-state tribunals for two
reasons. First, ASR Article 33 makes clear that the obligations of the responsible state, including
that regarding reparation, apply only to other states, and are “without prejudice to any right”
enjoyed by a nonstate actor, such as a foreign investor. The tribunal in Wintershall
Aktiengesellaschaft v. Argentina recognized this limitation in interpreting the jurisdictional
provisions of the U.S.-Argentina bilateral investment treaty (BIT). 86 Zachary Douglas has
interpreted this provision, as well as parts of Chorzów Factory, as suggesting that certain forms
of reparation are unique to the interstate context and that <10>ICSID<10> tribunals, which
address what he calls “the vindication of private interests,” may not have the authority to award
the same damages to an investor as a state would receive.87 Brigitte Stern makes a related point
that reparation can benefit only state interests and “perhaps private individuals,” a position she
grounds in human rights law.88
Wintershall’s, Douglas’s, and Stern’s views on the inapplicability of Chorzów Factory
and the ASRs regarding the consequences of breach—including the duty of full reparation—to
the violation of investor rights have other arguments in their favor. For one, full reparation might
not adequately reflect the current political economy of investor-state relations, where investors
who sue might well be very sophisticated in terms of what they should have known about the
possibility of expropriation; and states may strain to provide full compensation in the event of
expropriations carried out in the national interest. I will return to this point in Part III below.
I need not decide whether all the ASR rules on consequences of a breach are inapplicable
to investor-state arbitration. At a minimum, Article 33 leaves open the possibility that rules
requiring full reparation might not apply to investors and affirms that if international investment
law provides a lex specialis, then that law would prevail.89 Article 55 confirms that the ASRs do
not apply if a lex specialis governs a state’s responsibility. So, it is certainly possible for
international investment law to have its own rules on consequences of a treaty breach, including
recourse to the treaty standard for the quantum of damages.90

85

Int’l Law Comm’n, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
Arts. 30–31, 35–36, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ASRs].
86
Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentina, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/04/14, para.
113 (Dec. 8, 2008) (ASRs “contain[] no rules and regulations of State Responsibility vis-à-vis
non-State actors.”).
87
Zachary Douglas, Other Specific Regimes of Responsibility: Investment Treaty
Arbitrations and <8>ICSID<8>, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 815, 829
(James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson eds., 2010); see also Zachary Douglas, The
Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 183. For a critique,
see CHARLES LEBEN, THE ADVANCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 54–61 (2010).
88
Brigitte Stern, The Obligation to Make Reparation, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 87, at 563, 567. But see Martins Paparinskis, Investment Treaty
Arbitration and the (New) Law of State Responsibility, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 617, 635–40 (2013)
(offering arguments for extending ASR rules to investor-state disputes).
89
ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 33 comm.
90
See Vestey, supra note 60, paras. 327–29 (acknowledging this possibility).
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Second, even if a tribunal decides to use the ASRs to determine damages, the concept of
compensation “for the damage caused,” or Chorzów Factory’s “wiping out all the
consequences,” is open to significant interpretation and does not point to a single answer
regarding the date of valuation or the inclusion of other losses.
The result is three significant gaps in the case law and doctrine. It does not tell us: (a)
whether international investment law has a lex specialis regarding damages for expropriations;
(b) if so, what that lex specialis might require in terms of the quantum of compensation; and (c)
if not, what “full reparation” means in the context of different sorts of expropriations.
B. Toward a Coherent Framework
One response to these gaps might be to leave things as they are on the understanding that
investor-state tribunals’ principal duty is to solve a dispute between two parties rather than
develop any—or much—coherent case law. The origin of IIA-based arbitration in international
commercial arbitration might support such a conclusion. Thomas Schultz has argued against
consistency on the grounds that it can freeze bad law in place.91 Critiques of consistent legal
reasoning across cases raise many questions beyond the scope of this essay; but for my purposes
two brief, modest responses will suffice.
First, the various actors in the foreign investment process will benefit from some
predictability from arbitral awards. In considering whether to conclude an IIA, a host state will
understand what it is accepting if tribunals treat similar words in similar IIAs similarly. In case
of a dispute between an investor and a host state, if the parties see how tribunals have handled
cases using similar treaties, they will have a better sense of the strength of their claims and the
desirability of settlement. Lawyers in disputes will, or at least should, be able to avoid
relitigating settled issues. Other interest groups, whether labor unions or environmental activists,
will also be able to make more coherent and persuasive claims. Arbitration itself will have more
credibility if the damage award is grounded more firmly in legal principles and not seen as just
picking a number between those offered by the parties. This sort of minimalist consistency, as
opposed to an arbitral free-for-all, is essential to any rules-based system.92
Second, we must acknowledge that international investment law has many attributes of a
public law system. Although the public/private divide is both overrated and fuzzy, it remains the
case that, given the stakes for host states—the key repeat players—in adjusting national policies
to IIA standards and in devoting significant resources to pay damages, the need for some
predictability on key interpretive issues is essential.93 Even if—indeed, especially if—one favors
retention of decentralized, party-controlled arbitration, investment law has become an area where
stakeholders deserve some coherence in the law. More consistency will not allay many other
91

Thomas Schultz, Against Consistency in Investment Arbitration, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 297 (Zachary Douglas,
Joost Pauwelyn & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014).
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See Jürgen Kurtz, Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation in Investor-State
Arbitration: On Consistency, Coherence, and the Identification of Applicable Law, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 91, at 257, 269–75.
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See generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW
(2008). For an endorsement of some but not all of this characterization, see José E. Alvarez, Is
Investor-State Arbitration “Public”?, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 534 (2016).
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concerns of host states, e.g., the scope of IIA clauses on fair and equitable treatment, but it can
contribute to a system with more acceptability from the key stakeholders.
If some improvement in the status quo is normatively desirable, one obvious doctrinal
recourse would be to deploy principles of treaty interpretation in the hope that each IIA will
reveal its own set of remedies for breach; or perhaps a common set of remedies will emerge for
similarly worded clauses. The practice of states in response to treaty-violative expropriations
when there is no arbitration, or the travaux préparatoires, might reveal a treaty-specific, regimespecific, or even a customary law remedy.
Although such an inquiry might yield some holy grail of remedies, it seems extremely
doubtful. As for state practice under a treaty, states are unlikely to admit IIA violations if they do
eventually pay compensation to investors, thus making it impossible to know whether the
compensation paid “establishes the agreement of the parties”94—i.e., of the host state and the
investor’s state as to the meaning of the treaty. And for the same reason, any compensation paid
would be without opinio juris for purposes of customary law. Indeed, these same interpretive
disputes arose over the relevance of ad hoc or lump sum settlements to the customary law
standard of compensation.95 We can look to judicial opinions and the views of publicists, but
those are very source of the confusion.
With the case law inconsistent, the doctrine incomplete, and traditional methods of
interpretation unhelpful, development of a framework for remedies could proceed from one of
two bases. One, purely deductive and indeed philosophical, would seek to ground remedies in
the theories of property, torts, contracts, remedies, and related matters, including global justice—
for indeed all are relevant to expropriation. No doubt the ground is fertile for this sort of
research.
The other, and the one I adopt here, is to focus on actual community expectations about
remedies.96 That inquiry does not entail a search for an extant, agreed formula for remedies,
because both the case law and state practice demonstrate that we do not yet have one. Instead,
my theory looks for community expectations at the next level up, identifying the goals that
decision-makers agree should be served by the remedies to investors for treaty-violative
expropriations. Only if we understand the policy behind, and the point of, those remedies, rather
than merely recite the “wipe out all the consequences” mantra, can we begin to have a sense as to
what kinds of takings merit what kinds of payment.97 The result will be a framework for future
arbitral decision making, as well as treaty-drafting. I hesitate to use the word doctrine for it
suggests a rigidity and formulaic approach to resolving a highly complex set of decisions by
94

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
See, e.g., Sedco, supra note 25, at 184–89.
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See Higgins, supra note 19, at 321; MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, The
Prescribing Function in the World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 355, 368 (1981).
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For an examination of the goals of remedies for human rights violations, see Szilvia
Altwicker-Hámori, Tilmann Altwicker & Anne Peters, Measuring Violations of Human Rights:
An Empirical Analysis of Awards in Respect of Non-pecuniary Damages Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 76 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VÖLKERRECHT 1, 10–12 (2016). For a critical work developing the concept of sanctioning goals,
see RICHARD ARENS & HAROLD D. LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER: THE EMERGING
FIELD OF SANCTION LAW 198–203 (1961).
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states, investors, and tribunals. Doctrine is what got us into this mess in the first place. So, while
I aim for coherence and consistency, the model I propose can guarantee neither.
C. Purposes of Remedies for Treaty-Violative Expropriations
In my view, we can identify five goals of remedies as generally accepted by decisionmakers in and observers of the process of legal regulation of foreign investment.98 Decisionmakers might differ on how those goals should be operationalized, but I think the goals
themselves are generally shared. Although they are not set out in any one document, case law
and other discourse in the international investment community help us identify them. Beyond
these five purposes, four goals are more controversial and contested.
1. Repairing the Damage to the Expropriated Investor
The first, and perhaps primary, purpose of a remedy for treaty-violative expropriations, or
indeed compensation for any expropriations, is focused on the interests of, and losses to, the
target of the taking. Whether or not the state was justified according to the relevant law
(domestic or international), the investor has typically experienced a financial loss from the taking
of its property. Seen from the perspective of property or tort theory or basic notions of justice,
restitution or compensation is ordinarily due.99 Payment might be a redress for an illegitimate
transfer or a means of legitimating it ex ante; but either way, the goal of payment is to offset or
eliminate the loss the target of the taking has suffered.100 A remedy may also need to repair
consequential harms associated with the property loss, such as the cost of abandoning the
investment or even the costs of contesting the expropriation in court. This goal of repairing the
loss does not equate with a guarantee of compensation—e.g., the investor may not deserve it for
other reasons (such as, contributory fault), the investment may be worthless, or the state may
have overriding interests that justify nonpayment—but the restorative function is central to a
remedy.
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For a set of complementary goals of investor-state arbitration generally, see Sergio Puig,
No Right Without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor-State Arbitration, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 91, at 235, 243–48. See also Anne van Aaken,
Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Political Economy Analysis, in DISTRIBUTION OF
RESPONSIBILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 153, 158–61 (André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs eds.,
2015) (contrasting instrumental and noninstrumental goals).
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Peter Benson, Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 752, 798 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); Jules Coleman,
Scott Hershovitz & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of the Common Law of Torts, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, sec. 3.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), at
https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=tort-theories; Joel Feinberg,
Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 93, 102 (1978).
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Coleman & Kraus, supra note 4, at 1337.
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The harm to the investor from a treaty-violative expropriation might be greater than the
harm from a treaty-compliant expropriation.101 If the investor is denied some due process, or not
paid on time or at all, it may experience additional harms beyond the loss of the property. These
include the inability to invest the proceeds due the investor under a treaty-compliant
expropriation or even mental harm (in the case of individuals) from abandoning the investment
in an unpredictable way. So, remedies need to take into account any additional harm cause by a
treaty-violative expropriation.
Despite differences among states over the precise amount an investor should be paid, the
foreign investment law regime clearly recognizes this investor-oriented goal for remedies.102 The
duty in countless IIAs on the state to compensate the investor—not its home state—in an amount
equal to the FVDE is a recognition of the goal of repairing the harm to investors from all
expropriations. Indeed, this goal is at the core of most international law approaches to remedies.
Thus, the debates within both jurisprudence and the case law over remedies are focused on the
question of what was really lost to the investor and how much compensation can repair that
harm. And it is at the center of debates between arbitrators, whether in the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal or as recently as Quiborax, often using Chorzów Factory as a sort of trope.
Yet despite this emphasis on repairing the harm to investors, remedies serve other goals
as well. While often not explicit in the case law (perhaps because arbitrators may see the
elaboration of such considerations as ultra vires), these other goals are part of the community’s
expectations on remedies and must guide our choices.
2. Putting the Correct Incentives on Host States
A remedy for treaty-violative expropriations also serves a function oriented toward the
taker, rather than the taken, one centered on placing certain incentives on host states.103 It puts an
incentive on the state to follow the IIA’s criteria when it does want to expropriate. Tribunals do
not speak in terms of incentives,104 but it is clear that state responsibility for treaty violations,
including damages, aims at providing them.105 Scholars have offered various theories for why
states comply with legal obligations, whether in response to internal dynamics or external
relations with other states. But it does not take a particularly imaginative theory to conclude that
101

I am not assuming that the compensation paid in a treaty-compliant expropriation, i.e.,
FVDE, eliminates the harm to the investor, as the investor may value the investment more than
the FVDE.
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See, e.g., José Enrique Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing
International Investment, 344 RECUEIL DES COURS 54, 193, 231–32 (2011) (“the point is to make
claimants whole for their losses”); Puig, supra note 98, at 245, 252 (“corrective” rationale); van
Aaken, supra note 98, at 160.
103
Indeed, the requirement in IIAs that the state pay for expropriation deters the taking of
private property in the first place, just as the lack of such a requirement for bona fide regulations
of a nonexpropriatory character signals that such measures are permissible (although the risk of
an FET violation can interfere with this signal).
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For a suggestion that the purpose of the IIA expropriation provisions is to channel takings
into particular methods, see Siag & Vecchi, supra note 56, para. 428.
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See van Aaken, supra note 98, at 159–61 (noting also that absence of fault requirement
serves a deterrence function).
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a duty to pay compensation for a treaty-violative expropriation, assuming it can be enforced, can
affect state incentives to violate the treaty.
Moreover, it would also seem that to place the proper incentive on the state to comply
with the treaty, the damages for treaty-violative expropriations should exceed the compensation
for treaty-compliant expropriations; for otherwise the state would see no interest in complying.
But, in fact, we cannot be sure, if only because states have other reasons—in particular
reputational—to comply with IIAs than additional financial loss for noncompliance.106 Whether
damages for the former must exceed the compensation for the latter in order to incentivize states
to follow an IIA is ultimately an empirical question.107 (I will leave aside the broader question of
whether an IIA, or compliance with it, promotes foreign investment, on which views differ
greatly.)
Moreover, as economists have pointed out, goals (1) and (2) can sometimes conflict.
Some remedies aimed at providing compensation to the target of a treaty-violative taking can
over-deter, i.e., deter not merely violations but desirable conduct, by causing states to refrain
from economically useful or efficient expropriations for fear of big payouts.108 It could also
cause states to pull out of IIAs or <10>ICSID<10> or to ignore awards, anecdotal evidence of
which can already be seen in the reactions of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Russia to adverse
rulings in investor-state arbitration.
3. The Expressive Purpose of a Remedy
Legal remedies can also serve an expressive function, a goal well accepted for domestic
criminal law, but which is not limited to either criminal punishment or the domestic sphere.109 A
remedy can express a societal view about the importance of the underlying legal norm, often a
prohibition. But it can also express the efficacy of law itself, which seems critical in the case of
international investment law. Remedies for treaty-violative expropriations send a signal to states,
investors, and other actors in the foreign investment process that violations of treaties will not go
unnoticed—that the law is, in a broad sense, operational and not merely a paper tiger.110 Thus,
beyond the effect of compensation on the investor or the state, the meting out of consequences
serves an independent goal, one that is essential to the integrity of the legal system. It is a
106

See, e.g., ANDREW T. GUZMÁN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 71–117 (2008).
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The state’s prediction regarding whether the foreign investor will sue in response to a
treaty violation will also affect incentives. See JAN PETER SASSE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 91–93 (2011).
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Id. at 100–01; see also Louis T. Wells, Double-Dipping in Arbitration Awards? An
Economist Questions Damages Awarded to Karaha Bodas Company in Indonesia, 19 ARB. INT’L
471, 478 (2003); van Aaken, supra note 98, at 184, 186. High damage awards can also send
economically inefficient signals to investors, as noted infra note 131.
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See generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95 (1970). On such theories in
constitutional law, see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A Restatement, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 1503 (2000). On international criminal law, see MARK
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profound expression of what the policy-oriented approach to international law calls “control.”111
This idea extends to many other contexts. For instance, if a state is required to pay dues to an
international organization and pays them late, loss by the state of its vote in the institution’s
constituent assembly is more expressive of the law’s efficacy than a requirement that it pay
interest on a late payment.112
Though the term may originate in American legal philosophy, the expressive purpose of a
remedy is suffused into international jurisprudence. Recall that the PCIJ in Chorzów Factory said
that it would be “unjust” for Poland to pay the same amount for expropriating German assets in
violation of the 1922 treaty as it would if expropriation had been allowed under the treaty.113
Although morally the point makes little sense (is it really unjust in a philosophical sense?), the
Court seems to be suggesting that violations of treaties, if unaddressed through remedies tailored
to the violation, are threats to the possibility of law as a constraint on state action. In the Tehran
Hostages Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made a similar move in highlighting the
consequences of continued flouting of both the Court’s orders and the underlying diplomatic
law.114
4. Maintaining the Viability of the International Legal Regime on Foreign Investment
Remedies also need to advance the broader goals of the regime of which they are a part.
This goal for remedies starts with a doctrinal premise—that remedies for breaches of the treaty
should generally reflect the object and purpose of the treaty. This point has been recognized,
albeit obliquely, by the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo and Fisheries Jurisdiction cases.115 It also flows
from the interaction of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and customary
international law. Article 31 of the VCLT commands that interpreters of a treaty take into
account its object and purpose. Because identification of a breach requires interpretation of the
treaty, when a decision-maker classifies an act as a breach of a treaty, he or she will typically
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See MCDOUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 96, at 377–78.
See UN Charter, Art. 19. As evidence of the unwillingness of the UN’s member states to
enforce that sanction, see Rep. of the Comm. on Contributions, Seventy-First Session, UN Doc.
A/71/11 (2016).
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take into account the object and purpose of the treaty (except perhaps in the case of some very
obvious facial violation).116
Now consider the implications of this conclusion for remedies. First, assume that the
consequences of the breach arise under custom alone, with its overall requirement as one of “full
reparation,” or “wiping out all the consequences” of the breach. If the identification of the breach
requires considering the treaty’s object and purpose, then so should the identification of the
remedy that will eliminate the consequences of the breach. Second, assume that the
consequences of breaches arise under a lex specialis unique to that treaty. In that case, certainly
that lex specialis must reflect the treaty’s object and purpose just as the underlying primary
obligations do.117 Either way, tribunals should devise remedies that respect a treaty’s object and
purpose.
In the case of IIAs, each treaty differs in its combination of investor rights and host state
prerogatives. Yet, when viewed as a whole, the corpus of IIAs does share the purpose of creating
a broadly accepted international legal regime on foreign investment. The proliferation of
substantially similar bilateral and multilateral investment treaties suggests that most governments
agree that some regulation of foreign investment is useful for promoting economic welfare in the
host state. At the same time, the content of that regulation has changed over time, as the relative
economic and political power of host states, home states, investors, and nonstate actors has
changed.118 Just as the underlying rules reflect that political economy, so should the remedies for
their violation. If they do not, some participants will decide they do not want to be part of that
legal regulation, and the regime will unravel.
In particular, to maintain the viability of the regime, the remedies, like the rules, must
take account of the profound changes in the regime since Chorzów Factory or TOPCO. We are
no longer in a world in which the point of foreign investment law is to protect Northern investors
against Southern host states. Rather, IIAs strike a balance between host state prerogatives and
investor interests whose ultimate aim is the economic advancement of the host states. 119
Contemporary IIAs and free trade agreements reflect a greater deference to host state concerns,
as seen in the definitions of expropriation and fair and equitable treatment, and the exclusion of
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See Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan, N.Z. intervening), 2014 ICJ Rep. 226,
paras. 55–58 (Mar. 31); ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 12, comm. para. 1.
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See generally DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 97–
102 (2d ed. 2005) (linking remedies to unique nature of human rights treaties). See also Chorzów
Factory, supra note 5, at 47 (noting “aim of . . . the Convention” as preserving the property
rights of Germans in Poland). Cf. Audley Sheppard, The Distinction Between Lawful and
Unlawful Expropriation, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 169,
184 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006) (noting complete prohibition on expropriation in Chorzów
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For a review of those changes, see generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
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certain domestic regulation from arbitration. 120 When tribunals find expropriations, their
approach to a remedy should respect the same balance or dynamic reflected in these treaties. This
goal does not point to one solution regarding remedies for treaty-violative expropriations; but it
suggests that any alternative to the status quo in the case law must take account of the interests,
power, wealth, knowledge, and other features of the participants in the foreign investment
process.
Some tribunals seem to have recognized this goal when they speak of interpreting IIAs in
a “balanced” way, reflecting both investor and state interests.121 Others have invoked the need to
take into account the expectations of the community of states regarding investment law, usually
in the context of explaining their approach to earlier decisions.122 This goal also offers another
perspective on why tribunals do not award restitution to investors beyond the obvious practical
difficulties in enforcement (which tribunals obliquely recognize when they talk about the
impossibility of enforcement of restitution).123 Such a remedy would frustrate a purpose of the
IIA, which is to preserve the right of states to take foreign property, subject to conditions.
It might be questioned whether arbitrators themselves should take such a goal into
account. In his Freshfields Lecture, Michael Reisman found it generally illegitimate for
arbitrators to consider systemic goals in their deliberations, both because such considerations are
not part of their interpretive mandate under the Vienna Convention and because the participants
in the investment law system lack a shared vision of its goals. He fears that arbitrators will use
these considerations to sacrifice principled decision-making for political expediency.124 Reisman
is surely correct that arbitrators have different functions from those who draft treaties or analyze
cases; their function is more backward-looking than forward-looking.
But inclusion of this goal is justified for two reasons with respect to remedies. First, the
proposals I offer below can be developed in law through alternative means, e.g., new treaties or
other modes of lawmaking. Second, even if arbitrators end up developing a new approach to
remedies, systemic considerations are a legitimate consideration when the law has a lacuna, a
point Reisman notes. This is indeed the case for remedies, where, as discussed above, the law—
the particular IIA and custom—do not provide a clear answer. In those cases, the judge may have
reference to what Reisman calls “the community’s law and agreed policies,” including “the
systemic implications of alternative elements of decision.”125 Without exaggerating the degree of
consensus among participants in the international investment law regime over its goals, the
arbitrator can certainly consider whether some remedies would undermine confidence in that
regime more than others.

120

See, e.g., id., ch. 8.2, Arts. 14, 16, ann. on “Expropriation”; ch. 8.3, Art. 1.
See, e.g., ST-AD GmbH v. Bulgaria, PCA Case No. 2011-06, Award on Jurisdiction,
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(2013).
125
Id. at 149–50.
121

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017

25

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 131 [2017]

26
5. Ease of Administration
Lastly, any remedy, whether under customary law or a lex specialis, must be capable of
administration by the tribunal determining damages. The general refusal to order restitution
reflects arbitrators’ realization that states will almost certainly not reverse course on something
as important as an expropriation of foreign property.126 But ease of administration is not just
about getting the host state to cooperate; it also requires that we develop modes that tribunals can
implement given the information available to them. Although every award of damages involves
discretion by the tribunal, the more a remedy requires recourse to a valuation method with highly
complex, contested, or speculative elements, the more difficult it is for tribunals to determine a
remedy and then justify it in their award. This challenge is compounded by the wild variations in
valuations offered to tribunals by party-retained accounting firms.
Prediction will often be an element of valuation—it is the essence of the DCF method—
but some predictions are better than others.127 Tribunals already seek to advance this goal when
they say, as they often do, they will not consider speculative damages, but the line between
prediction and speculation is not always so clear. 128 Given the need for awards to be
understandable to the litigators, it is important to keep the arbitrators’ mandate manageable when
it comes to damage calculations.
D. Other Arguable Goals for Remedies
One might advance other goals for remedies for treaty-violative expropriation. Four are
worth brief mention, along with the reasons they are not generally accepted.
1. Economic Efficiency
Law and economics literature is replete with analyses of the most economically efficient
remedies for torts, contract breaches, and takings.129 These theories specify the damages or
126

See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/02/1, para. 87
(July 25, 2007) (restitution beyond the power of a tribunal); Arif v. Moldova, <8>ICSID<8>
Case No. ARB/11/23, para. 571 (Apr. 8, 2013); Christine Gray, The Different Forms of
Reparation: Restitution, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 87, at 589,
595–96.
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In addition, if DCF requires that the tribunal consider only information known to the
parties as of a particular date, then uncertainties arise not merely over prediction, but
retrospection.
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ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 12, comm. para. 1; Art. 36, comm. para. 27; and cites therein.
For a typical statement by a tribunal, see BG Group Plc. v. Argentina, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, para.
428 (Dec. 24, 2007).
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compensation that place the right incentives on various parties, spread the risks of harm
efficiently, or strike the right balance between social costs and private costs; or the amount of
insurance potential victims will and should purchase to protect against the risk of property
loss.130 They have had a significant influence on the domestic law and scholarship of tort and
contract damages. Economic approaches might suggest basing valuation of expropriated property
on the minimum amount for which the investor would be willing to sell the investment (the
“reservation price”), the amount for which he would buy insurance on the investment (the
“implied insurance price”), or some other measure to encourage the state to engage only in
economically efficient takings.131
Yet the case law shows that investment tribunals do not consider economic efficiency in
the sense advanced by economists. Certainly, tribunals rely on economic concepts such as DCF
to determine fair market value, and they rely on economic models to estimate future profits or
prices for assets. But they do not look at incentives, social versus private costs, or other standards
of economic efficiency. And neither of the dominant views in the case law about damages—i.e.,
FVDE or FVDA—is based on these rationales.
Practitioners and scholars of international investment law can lament this situation or
praise it. Even those who favor an economic approach would then confront competing economic
theories as to the best choice of damages. The lack of consensus on the desirability of economic
analysis and its content seems destined to keep efficiency considerations out of the doctrine of
remedies for IIA violations.132 This seems particularly true given the epistemic community of
international arbitrators and its self-perceived goal of resolving a particular case.133 So however
much we might view efficiency as a useful goal for remedies, it remains, at this point, a bridge
too far for international investment law.
2. Punishment of Violations
Punishment of violations is the essence of criminal law and an accepted component of
tort law in some countries for grievous torts. In the realm of international law, however, the
formal doctrine still generally rejects punishment as a response to violations of legal rules. The
ASRs, for instance, state in the commentary to Article 36, “[Compensation] is not concerned to
punish the responsible State, nor does compensation have an expressive or exemplary
character.” 134 In fact, the case law and doctrine is more nuanced, with awards and some
130

On the last point, see Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance of
Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 144 (1977).
131
For commentary invoking these insights in the international investment law context, see
Alan O. Sykes, Economic “Necessity” in International Law, 109 AJIL 296, 321 (2015)
(suggesting lower compensation for expropriated investors to prevent overinvestment in the host
state); Wells, supra note 108, at 478–81.
132
Though economists have examined the effect of IIAs on investment flows to host states,
they have not addressed the effects of different remedies on the host state, investor, or
investment flows. See generally THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS
(Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
133
See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 124.
134
ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 36, comm. para. 4.
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scholarship endorsing the possibility of punitive awards, particularly with respect to international
crimes.135
Yet in the realm of international investment law, at least, because states tend to justify
their actions in terms of public interests, and those actions rarely involve a personal or physical
harm to the investor, tribunals do not recognize any punitive goal, nor should they (even as we
cannot discount the possibility that investment arbitrators act from such a perspective). Indeed,
the ASRs’ aversion to punishment for violation of interstate duties would seem to apply a fortiori
to violation of duties by states to foreign investors. To the extent claims, arbitrators, or
commentators might justify greater damages for so-called unlawful expropriations because they
serve to punish the state for breaching the treaty, that rationale offers yet another argument
against both the term itself and the automaticity of a larger damage award.136 In examining the
options for remedies below, we will need to avoid those that are punitive.
3. Unity of Remedies for Violations of International Law
A third potential goal for remedies for expropriation is to achieve a consistency across
doctrinal areas when it comes to violations of legal rules. For those concerned about
fragmentation, a unified view of remedies, based on the ASRs, seems like one way to build
coherence in the international legal order. Some investment tribunals seem to be influenced by
this goal in their citation of ECHR cases, and in particular Papamichalopoulos, for the idea of
FVDA as the appropriate remedy for a treaty-violative expropriation.137
Whatever the hopes for its proponents, such a unified approach has no place in the
context of international investment law. First, as noted, the ASRs make clear that their reparation
rules do not apply if the law has developed a lex specialis on the consequences of a breach.138
The ILC’s 2006 study on fragmentation states that such special regimes—which it emphasized
are in no way “self-contained”—are not a threat to the integrity of international law.139
Second, unity of remedies across regimes is particularly ill-suited for expropriations,
which take place in numerous contexts and are adjudicated in diverse institutional settings.
Different institutions have adopted distinct approaches to the existence of a taking—in particular,
whether regulatory action crosses the line to a compensable taking—a trend that is not
lamentable but rather necessary to advance the purposes of each institution and the regime it
oversees.140 Just as a human rights regime might have a threshold for classifying governmental
action as a taking different from that of the IIAs’ investment regime, the former might well have
need for different remedies compared to the latter. Human rights law protects property from
135

Nina H.B. Jørgensen, A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages in International Law, 68 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 247, 259–62 (1998).
136
For one endorsement of punitive damages, see Sedco, supra note 25, at 204–05 and n. 40
(Brower, sep. op.).
137
See, e.g., ADC, supra note 61, para. 497; Tidewater, supra note 66, para. 133, n. 218.
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ASRs, supra note 85, Arts. 33, 55.
139
Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, paras. 152, 192–94, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(Apr. 13, 2006).
140
Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of
Fragmented International Law, 102 AJIL 475 (2008).
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certain intrusions by the state in the context of an overall goal of protection of individual rights
and dignity, goals that are distinct from those of the investment regime.141 And investment
insurance regimes, such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), also advance
different goals, including encouraging domestic companies to invest abroad, while also being
financially self-sustaining, which might justify a sui generis standard for compensation as
reflected in an insurance contract.142
Uniformity for its own sake thus ignores regime-specific goals, e.g., the fourth goal
above with respect to remedies. Moreover, it fails to take into account that a remedy for takings
in other regimes may also necessitate a different balancing of the goals, or the possibility of other
goals. Thus, the specific approach that I endorse below will reach its limits in a different
institutional context.
4. Distributive Justice
Finally, the case can be made that remedies should advance distributive justice, whether
in rectifying North-South wealth inequities or those between some foreign investors and some
developing states. In the pre-IIA era, the debates over compensation for expropriation, especially
in the context of large-scale social changes, were intertwined with North-South debates about the
legacy of colonialism. Some recent critiques of foreign investment law have criticized the
substantive duties in IIAs and the process of investor-state arbitrations as exacerbating
distributive injustices.143
Some of these critiques are quite persuasive, although I have argued that, under a
conception of global justice oriented toward the protection of basic human rights rather than deep
distributive justice, it is premature or overstated to claim that the foreign investment legal regime
is unjust.144 A proposal for remedies for IIA violations based on advancing distributive justice
would be useful for future lawmaking. For my purposes here, however, the key point is that deep
distributive justice is not a goal shared by international investment law decision-makers. It is
absent from the provisions of IIAs and not part of the considerations of arbitrators.
III.

EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO COMPENSATION FOR TREATY-VIOLATIVE
EXPROPRIATIONS

Having identified five goals of remedies for IIA violations, I now use those goals to
appraise the three main alternatives for compensation.145 Drawing on the approaches taken by
tribunals to date, I identify three possible options:
141

Cf. Stern, supra note 88.
See Ratner, Regulatory Takings, supra note 140, at 489–93. For an example of OPIC
coverage, see Memorandum of Determination: Expropriation of Global Forestry Management
Group (Russia), OPIC Contract of Insurance No. F339, at 8 (Apr. 16, 2011) (citing limitation in
compensation and investor’s duty to bear 10 percent of loss).
143
These critiques are summarized in STEVEN R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MORAL RECKONING OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 373–77 (2015).
144
See id. at 352–73.
145
I will assume that restitution is not possible, an assumption justified by the remedies
awarded even by tribunals invoking Chorzów Factory or the ASRs.
142
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(1) Any violation of the criteria for a treaty-compliant expropriation will trigger the level of
compensation provided in the IIA—an approach that sees the treaty text as offering a lex
specialis for damages. The cases in Group 1 in Part I.B above fall into this category.
(2) Any violation of those same criteria will trigger the customary law duty to provide full
reparation, even as full reparation might be calculated different ways. The cases in
Groups 2–4 in Part I.B above fall into this category.
(3) Different violations of the IIA criteria will trigger different remedies.
None of these options requires a tribunal to use the confusing lawful/unlawful terminology. They
each begin with the assumption that the state has breached the IIA and then offer alternatives for
the possible remedy.
Other options for a remedy for treaty-violative expropriations are possible. Tribunals
could ignore violations of the first three criteria, and instead provide remedies only for lack of
payment. While tribunals have given states a large margin of appreciation on the public purpose
criterion,146 ignoring the other criteria would signal that the treaty text is a nullity as far as they
are concerned. Tribunals could also just assume or conclude that (1) and (2) are the same—that
wiping out the consequences of the expropriation means simply paying the treaty formula of
FVDE—as seems to have been done in the cases in Group 2 in Part I.B above. Although (2) might
lead in some situations to compensation based on the FVDE, an assumption that the customary
international law standard for a violation and the IIA standard are the same is unwarranted.147
A. A Valuation Primer
Before explaining the three options, it is important to clarify several economic concepts,
in particular because tribunals are often not explicit about them. For simplicity’s sake, we may
think of four points in the life of the investment dispute, at least with respect to an investment
that is a going concern. D0 is the date the investment starts producing income; DE is the date of
the expropriation; DA is the date of the award; and DT is the termination date, when the
investment stops producing income, which will we, for the sake of simplicity, assume is after the
date of the award.148 Thus:
D0----------------------------------DE------------------------------DA------------------------------DT
1. To reiterate a point made earlier, the full value of the investment at the date of the
expropriation—FVDE—could mean one of two things: either (a) the value of the investment at
146

See August Reinisch, Legality of Expropriations, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT
PROTECTION 171, 178–86 (August Reinisch ed., 2008).
147
Though beyond the scope of this paper, another option for tribunals is to provide a
different remedy for large-scale nationalizations, as recognized by the World Bank Guidelines,
WORLD BANK, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: REPORT TO
THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE AND GUIDELINES ON THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT, vol. II, at 43, princ. IV(10) (1992) [hereinafter WORLD BANK GUIDELINES].
148
In some situations, the investment ceases to produce income at some time before DA, but
the basic conclusions below remain the same.
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DE using information known at DE only, i.e., based on ex ante information—FVDE (ex ante); or
(b) the value of the investment at DE using information known at DA, i.e., based on ex post
information—FVDE (ex post). In the case of creeping expropriations, determining DE itself may
be quite complex or it may be necessary to value the investment at a date other than DE.149
2. If FVDE means FVDE (ex ante), then it is calculated as the sum of: (a) the DCF from DE
to DT, as expected at DE, discounted back to DE; and (b) interest from DE to DA.150
3. If FVDE means FVDE (ex post), then it is the DCF from DE to DT, i.e., the sum of: (a)
the DCF from DE to DA, based on information known at DA, brought forward to DA; and (b)
the DCF from DA to DT, as expected at DA, discounted back to DA.151 Thus, this second
version of FVDE—the ex post version—includes performance from DE to DA based on
information known at DA, whereas the first version includes only the performance from DE to
DA based on information known at DE.
4. These two versions of FVDE differ only if there are events after the expropriation that
were not predicted at DE that affect the DCF. If they had been predicted, they would have been
priced into the FVDE. But they can differ for many reasons, e.g., unexpected changes in
commodity prices.152
5. The full value of the investment at the time of the award—FVDA—is composed of two
components: (a) the expected DCF from DA to DT, discounted back to DA, i.e., the discounted
income stream after the award, as expected at DA; and (b) the accumulated income from DE to
DA, i.e., the income from the expropriation to the award, brought forward to DA.153 If only (a)
were awarded, the investor would lose the income between DE and DA.154
6. It is now clear that the FVDE based on ex post information is economically the same as
the FVDA. The two consist of the same two components: the actual performance from DE to DA,
brought forward to DA (i.e., both 3(a) and 5(b) above), + the expected performance from DA to
DT, discounted back to DA (i.e., both 3(b) and 5(a) above).155 As a result, when tribunals use ex
post information to calculate the FVDE, they are actually calculating—or at partially
calculating—the FVDA. Unfortunately, tribunals are often not clear about this move.
7. The key economic distinction, then, between FVDE (ex ante) and FVDA is whether we
judge value based on the expectations at time DE only; or whether we judge value based on the
149

For a proposal suggesting valuation well before the expropriation is complete, see W.
Michael Reisman and Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT
Generation, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115 (2004).
150
The ex ante information is that known just before the expropriation, so it does not
consider the expropriation’s effect on the value of the investment.
151
It is important to note that all DCFs after the expropriation must be calculated on the
assumption that the investment remains in the hands of the investor. So even information known
to the tribunal at DA must be information relevant to a valuation based on that assumption.
152
For an example, see Valasek, supra note 23, at 23–31.
153
As noted in note 151, the accumulated income is also based on the assumption that the
investor still owns the investment.
154
See, e.g., Abdala & Spiller, supra note 14, at 107–08; Lieblich, Determinations by
International Tribunals, supra note 31, at 43.
155
The rate for bringing performance forward may differ from the rate for discounting future
income back, but the equivalence remains the same. I appreciate clarification on this point from
Amiyatosh Purnanandam and James Hines.
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information we have at DA (both actual returns from the past and anticipated returns in the
future).156 As will be seen below, this economic distinction is critical for evaluating valuation
options. Indeed, the nub of the disagreement over how to treat treaty-compliant versus treatyviolative expropriations is over the treatment of information not available at DE.157
8. Finally, the formula in the typical IIA for payment to the investor must mean the FVDE
based on ex ante information alone, i.e., the sum noted in number 2 above. This is the amount
the state would have to pay the investor under the treaty at time DE. Obviously, the state could
base its full valuation under the treaty only on the information it (or the market) had at the time.
A treaty could not require payment of compensation based on actual future returns, information
that was not yet available to the state or the investor. So, the treaty formula must be the FVDE (ex
ante).158 However, tribunals that say they are applying the treaty formula and not some other
value are often not clear about whether they are in fact using only ex ante information. When I
use the term FVDE below, I am referring to the version based on ex ante information only.
B. Option 1: Lex Specialis Within the Treaty—The IIA Formula for All Treaty-Violative
Expropriations
An award of compensation based on the IIA standard—FVDE (i.e., FVDE (ex ante))—
represents a sort of built-in damages formula, under which the treaty itself specifies the
consequences for its own violation. Awarding this amount in all situations advances some but
not all of the goals of an expropriation remedy.
1. With respect to repairing the damage to the investor, in one sense this formula fairly
considers the harm insofar as it could be said that the investor will receive the value of what was
taken, plus interest. Neither the IIA violation itself, nor the character of the violation—i.e.,
whether the process conditions were violated in addition to the nonpayment of compensation—
has an economic effect on the value of the asset.159 Economically, under the Capital Asset
Pricing Model for valuing assets, the market price of the asset at a particular time requires the
use of ex ante information alone because the market price of an asset reflects (predicted) risk and
returns, not actual returns.160 We might thus say that the investor’s harm was confined to the
value as known at that time, because the taking also removed the risk of loss from him (not
merely the risk of gain).161
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FVDA will exclude other damages that might be related to an expropriation, e.g., certain
consequential damages.
157
Cf. Kinnear, supra note 37, at 558–59.
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See the posting by James Searby in the <8>OGEMID<8> Virtual Seminar on Damages in
Investment Arbitration – Session 3, Nov. 25, 2016.
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See Jan Paulsson, Ghosts of Chorzów: Maha Nuñez-Schultz v. Republic of the Americas,
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID,
NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 777, 787–91 (Todd
Weiler ed., 2005).
160
For one summary of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, see Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R.
French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2004).
161
See Franklin M. Fisher & R. Craig Romaine, Janis Joplin’s Yearbook and the Theory of
Damages, 5 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 145, 153–56 (1990); Beharry, supra note 72, at 211–12.
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Yet we could identify the harm differently—that what was taken was the ability to hold
and dispose of an asset as the investor chose.162 Under that view, the investor lost the possibility
that the asset might increase in value in a way that could not be foreseen at the time it was taken,
and so the treaty formula is inadequate to repair the damage. Although the investor would lose
that possibility even if the state had complied with the treaty—for all the investor can do in that
scenario is reinvest the proceeds of the FVDE paid by the state—it remains the case that the state
breaching the treaty has deprived the investor of that choice. In terms of risk-shifting, FVDE
shifts the risk of future, unexpected loss in value to the state; but if the investment increases in
value, the FVDE ends up depriving the investor of those gains.
A famous U.S. domestic analogy concerns the litigation over the abuse of trust by the
executors of Marko Rothko’s estate, who sold many of the artist’s works shortly after his death
in a self-interested deal. When Rothko’s heirs sued for their recovery after the paintings had
skyrocketed in value, the New York State courts awarded them the value of the paintings at the
time of the trial and not the much lower value at the time they were sold.163 The appeals court
distinguished the normal rule of trusts, under which a trustee who breaches the trust by selling
property at an inadequate price is not liable for any appreciation damages, by noting that here
the trustee had a duty to retain the property, so in that sense he “violated an integral condition of
the trust . . . [making the sales] inherently wrongful transfers which should allow the owner to be
made whole.”164 The similarity to Chorzów Factory is remarkable in the emphasis in both cases
on the violation of an independent duty. Yet we can also ask whether the equation of treaty
commitment with a trust, the violation of which allows for such appreciation-based damages, is
justified. The heir betrayed by someone with a duty to act on the former’s behalf seems harmed
in a worse way than the foreign investor protected by a treaty commitment to take property only
under certain conditions.
FVDE also seems inadequate if we view the protections of the IIA in terms of the
jurisprudential concepts discussed earlier. In the terms put forth by Jules Coleman and Jody
Kraus, we would say FVDE is the amount to legitimate a taking done in accordance with the three
process-criteria (analogous in some ways to the amount due the victim under a liability rule).165
But the amount to legitimate a taking may well be inadequate—or, at least, is not necessarily
adequate—as a measure of damages when the state does not act accordance with some or all of
the four criteria. We may not know the correct measure of damages, but we can at least say that
it should not be the FVDE.

162

See Lieblich, Determining the Economic Value, supra note 74, at 63. See also Thomas W.
Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L.J. 110, 119 (2002) (fair
market value as neglecting subjective value to the owner).
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In re Estate of Mark Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 322 (1977) (“To make the injured party
whole . . . since the paintings cannot be returned, the estate is therefore entitled to . . .
appreciation damages.”). These issues have arisen in contract law’s treatment of post-breach
events for valuation purposes, as seen in the UK House of Lords’ decision in Golden Strait Corp.
v. Nippon Yusen Kubishka Kaisha, [2007] UKHL 12 (Mar. 28).
164
Id. at 321–22.
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See supra note 4.
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Moreover, the IIA formula falls short in rectifying some harms to the investor associated
with the noncompliance with the treaty. The harms from lack of due process as well as
unexpected departure costs and other consequential damages are not captured in it.166
2. With respect to correct incentives regarding compliance, this formula fares rather
poorly. If the state pays the FVDE whether or not it complies with the treaty, with only interest to
distinguish prompt payment from tribunal-ordered late payment, then, all other things being
equal, the state has less incentive to comply with the IIA when it expropriates.167 States may
have other incentives to comply with the treaty, such as the reputational harm from being a
scofflaw or the need to attract foreign investment, but, ceteris paribus, a remedy that takes no
account of the law violation enhances the likelihood of its repetition.
At the same time, payment of FVDE, plus interest, should not generally incentivize a state
to engage in so-called “opportunistic expropriation,”168 takings where the state believes it will
profit more with the investment under its control than it would with the investment under the
investor’s control. The reason is that if the state and the investor both know that the investment is
likely to generate more profits than originally expected, that expectation will be built into the
FVDE even if it is paid later with interest.169 It is, however, possible that the state will know more
than the investor, e.g., if it plans some regulatory changes after the takeover that will make the
investment more profitable.
3. Regarding the expressive purpose, a remedy for treaty-violative expropriations based
on the treaty formula signals that violations will not go unaddressed; for the state will still have
to pay for its violation. However, FVDE does not send a special signal in terms of a sanction for
the treaty violation, as opposed to the lack of payment. In that sense, it does not provide the same
sort of control intention as would a rule based on a damages formula external to the treaty itself.
Put another way, there is a certain sense of unclean hands when the state that goes outside the
treaty by breaching it is required to pay only the amount specified in the treaty.
4. The internal treaty standard seems to advance the goal of a stable framework of
international investment law accepted by a broad range of parties. When states agree to a treaty
that specifies a formula for compensation for expropriation, it would seem to preserve
confidence in the system if tribunals awarded compensation based on that formula.170 On the
other hand, sophisticated host states ought to know that when they become parties to an IIA, they
are agreeing to the possibility that a tribunal could award expropriation damages above FVDE for
treaty-violative expropriations, and that if they wish to preserve FVDE as the sole formula for
compensation, they ought to so specify in the treaty. And perhaps future IIAs will so specify. But
for now, when host states are increasingly suspicious of investor-state arbitration, a strong case
166

See Merrill, supra note 162, at 118.
MARBOE, supra note 74, at 68.
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Valasek, supra note 23, at 3.
169
Thus, in ADC v. Hungary, assuming the parties could have predicted that the airport
would improve financially as a result of Hungary’s entrance into the EU, then the FVDA should
have been the same as the FVDE. Indeed, the tribunal seems to rely on FVDE at a certain point in
its valuation. See ADC, supra note 61, para. 507.
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See British Caribbean Bank, supra note 53, para. 261 (because article on expropriation
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method of evaluation of the compensation sought.”). For an academic endorsement, see
Sheppard, supra note 117, at 196.
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can be made that the treaty formula strikes a balance that will advance the durability of the
system. This idea is expressed in arbitrator Stern’s dissent in Quiborax, where she states that
relying on FVDE (which she emphasizes should be determined only using ex ante information)
represents a “fair interpretation of international investment law.”171
5. Lastly, as for administrability, the treaty standard requires valuation of an asset at the
time it was taken. Financial and valuation experts for the parties are working with, in essence,
time-stamped (at DE) data on the market value of the asset, which may include a projection of
revenue in the case of a going concern.172 As a general matter, this method, based on determining
the expectations at DE, seems more difficult than one where the financial experts can consider
economic data after DE, which may well account for some tribunals’ willingness to use post-DE
data.173
In sum, the internal lex specialis approach, under which treaty-violative expropriations
leads to an award of damages based on the treaty formula of FVDE (ex ante), plus interest to DA,
advances one, or perhaps two, of the goals of a remedy—repairing the damage to the investor, if
we to see that damages as limited to the value of the asset taken; and advancing the stability of
the investment regime. But it does less well in terms of repairing the full harm to the investor,
putting the right incentives on states to comply with treaties, and sending an expressive signal
regarding the consequences of law violation, and it may be administratively difficult.
C. Option 2: State Responsibility’s Default Rules—Full Reparation for all Treaty-Violative
Expropriations
Reliance on the ASRs’ concept of full reparation for damages—“wiping out all the
consequences” in Chorzów Factory’s famous phrasing—in the case of any treaty-violative
takings meets some of the above-stated goals, but, as with the prior solution, not all. The
difference between this option and Option 1 is the possibility for a tribunal to value the
investment based on FVDA as well as to include other damages not reflected in the value of the
investment.
1. Full reparation repairs the harm to the target if we see that harm as not merely the loss
of an asset in the past. For when the state violates the treaty, it harms the investor by depriving
him or her of the choice that the treaty provides to: (a) hold the investment and perhaps sell it
later (i.e., the investor’s choice if the state does not expropriate); or (b) invest the FVDE proceeds
(i.e., the investor’s choice if the state does expropriate). So, if the investor had held the
investment and it appreciated, the state’s treaty violation has deprived the investor of the
opportunity to enjoy that appreciation—although the investor should not enjoy any appreciation
due to the state’s takeover of the investment (perhaps due to lower labor costs or new
regulations). Damages based on FVDA allow for the possibility of this appreciation. While the
investor’s foresight in keeping or selling an investment, or investing the proceeds, should not be
assumed to be perfect, this remedy reflects that loss.
171

Quiborax, supra note 1, para. 56 (FVDA is “biased in favor of the investors”), 59, 102
(Stern, dissenting).
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Elena, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note 159, at 747, 765–68
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Valuation on the date of the award, using information known since the expropriation,
thus reflects the reality that the loss is ongoing until the date of the award. And if damages are
supposed to be a substitute for restitution, then the award date makes the most sense because that
is when the property would be returned to the investor, as several tribunals have recognized.174
Though some may object that damages would then “vary with the date of the award,”175 that
possibility is not normatively objectionable but inherent in the concept of fully repairing the
wrong. (Indeed, total damages will change with the date of the award even when they are based
on FVDE with interest, because of the accumulation of interest).
Yet what if the asset depreciates after the expropriation, due to factors not associated
with the expropriation itself? Does full reparation then require an award of lower damages than
the treaty standard of FVDE? It could be argued that the investor should receive less than FVDE,
insofar as when the investment depreciates post-taking (due to forces beyond either the control of
the state or the investor), the state’s violation of the treaty deprived the investor of only the
depreciated value.176 But this argument does not fairly describe the harm to the investor. Rather,
the investor had a right, under the terms of the treaty, to the FVDE. The investor’s rights under the
treaty make any subsequent depreciation not really “countable” for purposes of the harm, and
thus the customary law rule of full reparation would seem to require setting the treaty standard of
FVDE as a floor. 177 This choice also means that the risk of loss is borne by the state if it violates
the treaty. Another way to state this point is that the investor on the receiving end of a treatyviolative expropriation should not receive less than an investor who has experienced a treatycompliant expropriation.178
The result is the formula for full reparation introduced by Judge Brower in Amoco
International Finance, which sets the FVDE (again, based on the ex ante information) as a floor
on the remedy.179 By giving the investor the choice of FVDE and FVDA, the Brower formula shifts
the risk of depreciation of the asset to the state and the benefits of appreciation to the investor.
This risk-shifting better addresses the harm to the investor from the state’s deprivation of the
choice described above and thus provides full reparation.180

174

See Amco Asia, supra note 71, para. 186; Quiborax, supra note 1, para. 379. The classic
citation to this effect is GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 666 (3rd ed. 1957)
(“If restitution in kind were possible, it would have to take place as soon as possible after the
judgment or award.”); see also MARBOE, supra note 71, at 23; Herfried Wöss, Adriana San
Román Rivera, Pablo Spiller, & Santiago Dellepiane, Damages in International Arbitration
under Complex Long-Term Contracts 267–68 (2014). Whether restitution is truly preferred over
compensation remains unclear. See Yann Kerbat, Interaction Between the Forms of Reparation,
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 88, at 573.
175
Quiborax, supra note 1, para. 84 (Stern, dissenting).
176
Id., para. 103 (using this argument to show unfairness of full reparation under some
circumstances).
177
Abdala & Spiller, supra note 14, at 118.
178
I appreciate this point from an AJIL anonymous reviewer.
179
AIF, supra note 26, at 300–01, para. 18 (Brower, concurring).
180
Abdala & Spiller, supra note 14, at 108, 118; MARBOE, supra note 74, at 132. But see
Quiborax, supra note 1, para. 56 (Stern, dissenting) (arguing that this is biased in favor of
investors).
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Full reparation also has the possibility of addressing the damage to the investor from the
state’s violation of the BIT’s process conditions. That is, even if the asset has not appreciated at
all and FVDA is nothing more than FVDE plus interest, a full reparation model can conceivably
address the state’s failure to respect these criteria. To offer a colloquial example, if a customer
takes an item from a store and simply drops the cash equivalent of the price on the floor, we
might say that the shopkeeper has been harmed for a failure to follow the procedures for buying
merchandise.181
In addition, the full reparation model allows for damages to include not merely the FVDA,
but consequential damages, i.e., incidental losses to the investor from the taking. The treaty
formula does not do so.
Yet full reparation has drawbacks in terms of its calibration to the harm to the investor.
First, consider the implications of this approach for violations of the fourth, payment condition
typical of IIAs. The host state would have to pay extra damages above the FVDE even if it has
paid or offered a payment to the investor, as long as that amount is less than the FVDE as
determined by the tribunal. One could argue that a state should not be able to evade damages by
offering an insufficient amount to the investor. But insufficient payment seems materially
different from a failure by the state to pay anything at all, and the full reparation model does not
capture that possibility. In Coleman and Kraus’s terms, if payment according to the three process
conditions legitimates the taking, then insufficient payment is at least closer to legitimating the
taking than a deliberate refusal to pay, and the two scenarios should not be treated the same in
terms of damages. The same could be said if the state has a bona fide dispute with the investor
over who is the proper owner of the investment. Some tribunals and scholars have accepted this
distinction by asserting that nonpayment of compensation is not always a violation of the IIA in
the first place.182 Second, a state can violate the other three criteria in different ways, e.g., with
insufficient process as compared to no process at all. Treating all violations the same in terms of
the remedy ignores these nuances.
2. The full reparation model also seems better than the treaty formula at putting the right
incentives on states to comply with the treaty. If we care not merely that states pay for assets that
they expropriate, but keep the promises they have made—including the process conditions—then
a full reparation formula offers a better incentive to comply. It requires states to internalize all
the costs associated with the violation, including appreciation damages and consequential
damages. States cannot merely pay late with interest.
3. Full reparation generally fills the gap in the expressive value left by reliance on the
treaty formula. It sends a stronger message of the law’s relevance by treating violations as not
mere lapses to be corrected by late payment but as wrongs by the state to be assessed by
reference to external standards of damages. But it treats violations in a binary way, ignoring
possible bona fides by the state. It thus risks crossing the line from acceptable expression to
impermissible punishment.
4. The full reparation formula, however, raises significant concerns regarding the goal of
furthering the stability of the international investment legal regime. As shown from the examples
above, a state can violate the treaty in numerous ways, with different effects on the investor. A
181

I appreciate this example from Kyle Logue. Whether this can be quantified is a matter for
item (5) below.
182
See infra notes 189–190 and accompanying text (Tidewater, Venezuela Holdings, and
ConocoPhillips); Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 9–13 (Stern, dissenting).
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reparation formula that does not capture these nuances among treaty-violative expropriations
risks upsetting the current expectations among many states regarding their right to expropriate. If
tribunals routinely award FVDA (or FVDE based on ex post considerations) in a way that increases
already large awards against developing states, it could exacerbate the backlash against IIAs.
Certainly, states are bound by agreements they have signed, including those that entrust
the determination of violations and remedies to arbitrators. And host state claims that restrictions
on their ability to expropriate are a violation of their sovereignty are clearly wrong as a matter of
law (at least since Wimbledon). But expropriation remains a power of all states, and tribunals
should be careful about offering remedies clearly associated with other unlawful acts when the
state may have acted in good faith, albeit inconsistent with the IIA. As noted earlier, there is a
good case that tribunals should not apply the Chorzów Factory/ILC reparation rules to investorstate disputes, and the ASRs themselves allow for special regimes of responsibility. The
preservation of the system of IIAs through the confidence of all stakeholders is not advanced by
requiring the state to pay to the foreign investor (especially one insured), in all circumstances,
what it would have to pay another state. Thus, the risk to broad-based acceptability of the system
is significant.
5. A full reparation regime also has drawbacks from the perspective of administrability. It
requires a tribunal to determine a number of values that it need not under the treaty formula.
First, in determining the FVDA, the tribunal must not use the actual performance of the
investment since the expropriation, but rather the performance assuming the investor still owned
the investment, thus excluding any increased value due to the government’s takeover.183 For the
state should not have to compensate the investor for profits that the investor would not have
made, just as the investor should not be prejudiced by a decline in value due to the expropriation.
At least one tribunal, in Rumeli Telekom v. Kazakhstan, refused to award the investor for
increased value caused by the state, but the practice does not seem pervasive.184 But it may prove
difficult for a tribunal to determine whether the government did a better or worse job than the
investor would have done in managing the investment.185
Second, if full reparation means the greater of FVDE and FVDA, then the tribunal must
determine both the FVDE and the FVDA, which requires more accounting data (and arguments
between the parties) than does the IIA formula. The Yukos tribunal managed—in eighty pages of
reasoning—to perform this feat when valuation turned mostly on share prices, but others using
DCF or other valuation methods might find this quite difficult.186 Third, the tribunal must
determine consequential damages, i.e., costs to the investor from having to abandon its
investment.

183

This requirement offsets a normal advantage of calculating damages as of the date of the
award, namely that one can use actual returns after the original loss. See Wöss et al., supra, note
174, at 268. (For indirect expropriations, the post-expropriation performance will need to assume
the absence of those measures.) In the case of FVDE, although the tribunal must assume that the
investor remained the owner of the asset, it should be basing its calculations solely on
information available at FVDE (or right before the expropriation became known), which would
not reflect the possibility of increased (or decreased) profits due to a government takeover.
184
Rumeli Telekom, supra note 43, para. 807–13.
185
This challenge seems to be underestimated by MARBOE, supra note 74, at 37.
186
Yukos, supra note 6, paras. 1782–824.
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Thus, full reparation does reasonably well at advancing the first two goals of a remedy—
reparation of harm (though it might overcompensate the investor if we see a state’s
underpayment based on a bona fide disagreement with the investor as a lesser harm) and
incentives on the host state; but its binary approach to violations risks turning expression into
punishment, it is deficient in terms of respecting the political economy of the international
investment law regime, and it can be difficult to administer.
These concerns about Option 2 have significant implications for the continued relevance
to international investment law of Chorzów Factory, which remains routinely cited by tribunals
as the font of wisdom on remedies. Beyond the concerns noted earlier about the transposability
of customary international law on remedies developed in the interstate context to investor-state
disputes, and the economic anachronism of Chorzów Factory’s valuation techniques, the above
analysis underscores two key shortcomings of applying Chorzów Factory to IIA violations. First,
its distinctions between lawful and unlawful expropriations, and its sweeping rule for remedies
for the latter, are oblivious to the “infinite varieties” of the way a state may take property. And
second, its demand to “wipe out all the consequences” of a treaty violation detracts from several
critical purposes of a remedy.
Thus, whatever the merits of the full reparation approach to other regimes of international
law, or as a default rule of custom, tribunals should stop assuming its relevance as a starting
point for remedies in investment law. There is a certain irony here, for Chorzów Factory
originated in an investment dispute; though it has come to stand for a much broader proposition
in customary international law, it has also become quite outdated when it comes to the remedies
needed in international investment law.
D. Option 3: The Differentiated Approach: Tailoring Remedies to the Contours of the IIA
Violations
Under the third approach, the nature of the treaty violation determines the remedy. Rather
than defaulting to either the treaty standard or the full reparation standard, the tribunal makes
choices about remedies based on what the state has actually done in the course of its breach of
the IIA. At this point I will assess this approach in terms of the five goals of remedies. I will not,
for now, appraise any single formula that tailors remedies to treaty violations.
1. A differentiated approach repairs the harm to the foreign investor insofar as it links the
conduct of the state in concreto, rather than the mere existence of a treaty violation, to the
remedy. Investors can be harmed in different ways by treaty-violative expropriations (or even
treaty-compliant ones). They may have faced an unfair process that did not allow them to contest
the action; been the target of discrimination on racial, religious, or other arbitrary grounds;
received partial payment, a promise of payment, or no payment. In addition, they may have
incurred large expenses in contesting the action or terminating the investment (the latter of which
they might incur in a treaty-compliant expropriation). Each of these violations has a distinct
impact on the investor.
2. This approach can also create the incentives on states to comply with their treaty
obligations. As noted above, Option 2 does this better than Option 1. At the same time, why
should we assume that full reparation (whether FVDA, or the choice between FVDA and FVDE)
provides the optimal set of incentives to induce compliance with the treaty? If a state refuses to
pay FVDE but respects the process conditions, then we may be able to create an incentive for
them to pay FVDE (i.e., comply with the treaty) by requiring them to pay the difference with
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interest, rather than insisting on damages equal to the FVDA. If a state violates some but not all of
the process conditions, a remedy tailored to that violation, as opposed to a default rule of FVDA,
might incentivize the state to follow the conditions they violate. A flexible approach may do
better at providing the “sweet spot” in which we both fairly compensate the investor and provide
the necessary incentives on states.
3. A differentiated approach can advance the expressive goal of a remedy. The
importance of a treaty commitment can be reinforced without insisting that all violations are of
the same gravity, i.e., the signal sent by uniform recourse to either the treaty formula or a full
reparation rule. For example, a violation of the nondiscrimination criterion might well merit a
particularly significant remedy; failure to pay FVDE due to unsuccessful negotiations between the
state and investor would merit a lesser remedy.187
4. At a time when large awards against host states face resistance, any formula for
damages beyond the compensation specified in the IIA raises significant concerns. The
differentiated approach, insofar as it leaves open the possibility for a tribunal to set damages
based on standards external to the treaty, also faces this shortcoming. Yet the possibility that
tribunals might use the treaty formula for some violations, while reserving other, external
formulas for other violations, mitigates these concerns somewhat. A differentiated approach
might also afford more discretion to arbitrators than the earlier two options, which might produce
opposition from host states and others concerned about the impartiality of arbitrators.188 On the
other hand, arbitrators already have significant discretion in damage determinations. Thus, a
differentiated approach contributes to the viability of the regime, but only if arbitrators are able
to justify and tailor remedies so as to maintain the confidence of states.
5. Compared to the treaty formula, a differentiated remedy is more complex for
arbitrators to administer in terms of the calculation of damages because it requires looking at
more than just the ex ante determined FVDE. Compared to full reparation, that standard could
also be more complicated, insofar as a tribunal, instead of calculating the FVDA (or the FVDA and
the FVDE, under the Brower formula) and consequential damages, may have to monetize other
impacts of the expropriation on the investor. How, for instance, does one put a monetary value
on the failure of the state to follow due process?
In sum, the differentiated approach offers significant promise over the other two
alternatives. It offers the possibility of tailoring the remedy for treaty-violative expropriations to
the harm done to the investor while maintaining the right incentives on states to comply with the
treaty. It fulfills the expressive function better than the ASR remedy. It offers flexibility for
maintaining the confidence of various participants in the international investment law process.
Yet it may prove difficult to administer insofar as some of the violations may be hard to quantify.
IV.

OPERATIONALIZING A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO REMEDIES

187

Cf. Les Laboratoires Servier, Biofarma, and Arts et Techniques du Progrès v. Poland,
<8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA, para. 645 (Feb. 14, 2012) (tribunals have discretion to impose
additional damages “to punish Treaty violations of particular seriousness, such as discrimination
. . . .”). See also id., para. 642 (suggesting normal remedy is the treaty standard, i.e., in Group 2
in Part I.B above).
188
See generally CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 315–34
(2014).
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For the differentiated approach to further the goals of investment remedies consistently
across cases, it will need to be specified at a higher level of detail. (Thus, while I believe
tribunals must consider the five goals in order to arrive at a new framework, once that framework
is adopted, it should be the basis for determining remedies.) Some movement is already afoot in
this area, even as tribunals rely on the lawful/unlawful distinction. In ConocoPhillips v.
Venezuela, the tribunal decided that an expropriation in breach of the Netherlands-Venezuela
BIT would lead, under Chorzów Factory, to damages based on the FVDA, but it interpreted the
BIT’s primary obligation of compensation to require only that the state engage in good faith
negotiations, thereby implicitly acknowledging that some forms of nonpayment might trigger a
different remedy from others.189 In Venezuela Holdings and Tidewater, the tribunals made a
similar distinction between refusal of payment and an offer of payment or failed negotiations
regarding amount of payment; in both cases, the tribunals held that the Venezuela did not violate
the IIA, and awarded FVDE.190
None of these tribunals, however, explicitly adopted a differentiated approach to
violations and remedies; they rather worked within the first two alternatives above and directed
their interpretation to the IIA’s primary obligation to compensate. That method has a significant
flaw, however, in that it treats certain treaty breaches—notably certain types of nonpayment—as
nonviolations. The IIA language on expropriations, however, is generally clear enough to make
such an argument very strained.191
Indeed, it is conceptually flawed for a tribunal to find, as it did in Tidewater, that a bona
fide disagreement over the FVDE is not a violation of the BIT and then to award the investor any
compensation—how can there be compensation if there is no violation of the treaty? The
tribunal’s solution of viewing nonpayment as still provisionally lawful, and that the parties
merely submitted to the tribunal the task of determining payment, is not consistent with the
request for arbitration.192 Although the text of IIAs allows for significant interpretation by
tribunals—notably whether an action is an expropriation in the first place—if a tribunal has
determined that an act is an expropriation, the treaty provisions on compensation do not provide

189

ConocoPhillips, supra note 63, para. 362. See also Sheppard, supra note 117, at 171
(calling an expropriation where only payment is lacking “provisionally lawful”).
190
See Venezuela Holdings, supra note 65, paras. 301–06; Tidewater, supra note 66, para.
145. Cf. EnCana Corporation v. Ecuador, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, LCIA Case No. UN3481, paras.
194–95 (Feb. 3, 2006) (nonpayment of a legally guaranteed tax refund does not amount in the
first instance to an expropriation if the claimant has other options and act is not willful). The
annulment committee in Venezuela Holdings did not question the Panel’s finding that the
expropriation did not violate the BIT.
191
See, e.g., EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 119, ch. 8.2, Art. 16 (“Neither Party shall . . .
expropriate . . . except . . . against payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation,”
further defined as the “fair market value of the investment at the time immediately before the
expropriation or the impending expropriation became public knowledge.”). A requirement of
“just compensation” that did not mention FVDE might give arbitrators more interpretive
maneuverability, but this was not the case in the four arbitrations mentioned. It is also possible
that nonpayment is not per se a ground of unlawfulness under customary international law.
192
See Tidewater, supra note 66, paras. 43–45, 55–57 (Claimants’ arguments).
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for the interpretive space to say that payment includes nonpayment.193 Despite these difficulties,
some commentators have suggested that mere nonpayment of compensation does not violate an
IIA.194
Rather than misread the treaty language, tribunals should treat the different sorts of
violations in the context of remedies. International investment law can thus develop a lex
specialis with respect to remedies for treaty-violative expropriations, but not one confined to the
internal treaty formula of FVDE. At the same time, it will not be based on a default to the ASR
formula. Rather, it can mix these elements and perhaps bring in others.
It might well be the case that tribunals are already engaging in this sort of approach
below the radar, using their discretion with the final damages number to tailor the remedy to the
nuances of the breach.195 If they are doing so, then the result is a significant disconnect between
that endpoint and the reasoning used to get there. Although we might applaud a tribunal for
striking a compromise acceptable to both parties, we should be less accepting of the lack of
transparency in its reasoning. Indeed, arbitrators who seek acceptability for their rulings beyond
the immediate parties should want an approach based on rules.
In developing the specific remedies associated with IIA violations, we must continue to
keep in mind, and advance as much as possible, the five goals associated with remedies.
Tribunals and scholars will disagree about how a remedy fares under each of the five factors and
the weight afforded to each factor. The solution offered here is thus not the only possible
approach, but it does what a remedy should do significantly better than the current approaches.
The differentiated approach proposed below is meant to be adopted and administered by
tribunals, but it is certainly feasible to consider incorporating it directly into future IIAs.
A. Rejecting Economically Flawed Formulas for Remedies
While the point may seem obvious, tribunals need to move beyond economically
antiquated notions of damages for expropriations. In the era of modern finance, terms like
damnum emergens and lucrum cessans simply have no place in international arbitration, even if
civil law systems continue to use them.196 The mere usage of those terms in frequently cited
cases such as Chorzów Factory or Amoco International Finance is not a reason for their
retention when they lack an economic basis. They also risk the possibility of double counting of
damages.197 It is unfortunate that they appear in some serious scholarship on expropriation.198
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Except in one extreme case—if the state offers FVDE, as later determined by the tribunal,
and the investor refuses to accept payment in the hope of getting more damages during
arbitration, then in my view the state has not violated the treaty. I appreciate this point from
Zachary Douglas.
194
See MARBOE, supra note 74, at 58; RIPINSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 80, at 67; Reinisch,
supra note 146, at 198–99.
195
I appreciate this point from Rachael Kent.
196
See John Y. Gotanda, Damages in Private International Law, 326 RECUEIL DES COURS 73,
105–11, 129–30, 145 (2007).
197
See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, The Expectation Model, in EVALUATION OF DAMAGES, supra note
82, 57, 62–65; Wells, supra note 108; Beharry, supra note 72, at 203–08.
198
See, e.g., Sacerdoti, supra note 80; CRAWFORD, supra note 81.
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The World Bank Guidelines offer a useful, economically rational set of valuation methods for
different sorts of expropriated investments.199
B. FVDE as the Remedy for Bona Fide Disagreements over Compensation
When a state violates an IIA by not providing the compensation required by the treaty,
i.e., FVDE, but the violation was due to a bona fide disagreement between the host state and the
investor over the FVDE, and the state respected the process conditions for an expropriation, then
the remedy for such a violation should be only the FVDE (i.e., based on ex ante information), plus
interest to the date of the award. By bona fide disagreement, I mean situations where the state is
committed to paying the treaty amount but has legitimate disagreements with the investor that
have prevented payment. The most obvious cases would be where the host state makes a good
faith calculation of FVDE that the investor rejects, or a there is bona fide disagreement about the
identity of the legal owner of the investment, but the principle would apply to similar cases
where the state still respects the process conditions. Thus, the host state’s domestic law could
require the government (or the investor) to follow certain administrative, judicial, or legislative
procedures before payment is approved—which can serve as an important protection for the
state’s treasury. If those procedures have not concluded and the investor seeks recourse to
investor-state arbitration, we can view the disagreement as bona fide assuming the state is still
committed to paying and the delay is justifiable under the circumstances.200
With respect to the five goals I have identified:
1. This solution repairs the most significant damage to the investor, insofar as the only
harm was not receiving the FVDE when it was due. The state did not harm the investor by
ignoring the process conditions or rejecting the possibility of a remedy; it did not seek to deprive
the investor of the ability to dispose of the asset or the proceeds as the latter chose in the future.
The harm to the investor from mere nonreceipt of the amount due under the treaty, absent more
aggravated circumstances, is repaired by the payment of FVDE plus interest. Payment of FVDE
completes the treaty-based process of expropriation and legitimates it.
As a conceptual matter, the idea of paying only the treaty amount for good faith failures
to pay resembles the remedy that courts in the United States award when insurance companies
fail to pay on their policies. If the failure is based on an incorrect but good faith interpretation of
the contract, only the amount in the contract is awarded. If the company fails to pay in bad faith,
then a greater amount is awarded (even as courts and commentators disagree on the sort of
conduct that would justify additional damages and how much they should be).201
2. It puts the right incentive on states. States are incentivized to work with the investor in
good faith in order to avoid higher damages. These negotiations, if successful, will prevent
199

WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 147, at 41–42, principles IV(5)–(6).
A separate question would be whether the FVDE determination arrived at by such
procedures is entitled to any deference by an investor-state tribunal.
201
See William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629,
636–41 (1999) (discussing key U.S. cases). The analogy is not perfect because the normal
damages for breach of the contract, i.e., the amount specified in the contract, are based on the
idea of expectation damages—which is akin in international law to full reparation—and the
additional damages are generally considered punitive damages. In the case of an IIA, the
additional damages beyond FVDE would be part of what is needed to make the investor whole.
200
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violations and ensure compliance, as well as prevent litigation. While it could incentivize states
to offer insufficient amounts and then negotiate (for the most the tribunal would later order is
FVDE), limiting the FVDE option to good faith disagreements should constrain manipulation of
the process.
3. It sends a signal that the law still matters—losing states still pay damages. At the same
time, by treating a bona fide disagreement over payment and a state’s clear flouting of the terms
of the treaty differently, it expresses the idea that the law treats the former less severely than the
latter and avoids a punitive outcome. The remedy reinforces the law’s relevance even as it
expresses a tolerance for legitimate disagreements between states and investors on the FVDE.
4. It reflects the political economy of the foreign investment process and thereby
promotes states’ willingness to participate in the legal regulation of that process. It recognizes
the failure to pay FVDE as a treaty violation, which respects the legitimate claims of home states
and their investors; yet states’ failure to achieve a meeting of the minds with the investor on the
amount of the FVDE or other issues will not be condemned through a harsh remedy.
5. Concerning administrability, on the one hand, the proposed rule requires the tribunal to
determine only the FVDE. On the other hand, that process requires use of dated information,
which might be difficult. More important, this proposal requires the tribunal to determine
whether the state’s failure to pay FVDE was due to a bona fide disagreement about the price, titleholder, or other factors. This task requires detailed analysis of the evidence regarding the parties’
negotiations and ultimately a verdict on blame, if any, for the failure of payment. This process
could extend the litigation. Yet Venezuela Holdings, Tidewater, and ConocoPhillips show that
tribunals are capable of making such an inquiry. Those tribunals looked closely at the parties’
interactions to conclude that in the first two, the state had acted in good faith, while in the last
one, it had not.202
By offering a different remedy for one form of nonpayment than for others, even though
both are treaty violations, this proposal is in tension with the ASRs, which do not link state
responsibility and the duty of reparation to intent on the part of the state—leaving such questions
for the primary rules—and provide only a limited set of circumstances precluding
wrongfulness.203 Yet the ASRs recognize that reparation is, after all, for a harm and even (albeit
incompletely) that a remedy should be proportional to the harm.204 So clearly less harm means
less compensation. The idea of gradations of damages based on the severity of the violations has
been accepted in other contexts. Notably, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission argued that
“the law of State responsibility must maintain a measure of proportion between the character of a
delict and the compensation due.”205
Finally, it is worth considering whether a state’s failure to compensate the investor
because the former does not view its actions as an expropriation at all should be treated as a bona
fide disagreement. In situations where the state denies that it is expropriating, it will probably not
202

ConocoPhillips, supra note 63, paras. 382–401; Venezuela Holdings, supra note 65, paras.
301–06; Tidewater, supra note 66, paras. 144–45.
203
ASRs, supra note 85, Art. 2, comm. para. 10; Arts. 20–26. For example, I am not seeking
to justify the lower payment on some claim of necessity by the state given the very narrow
grounds of that excuse.
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Id. Art. 35, comm. para. 5; Art. 37(3); Art. 49, comm. para. 6 (limits of countermeasures).
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Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n, Final Award of Ethiopia’s Damages, para. 312 (Aug. 17,
2009), at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/767.
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provide due process or compensation. This case seems somewhat closer than the other bona fide
disagreements noted above.
As for the harm to the investor, we could limit compensation to FVDE and address any
additional harm from the violation of due process through proposal D below. As for incentives
and the expressive value of a remedy, the possibility of paying only FVDE might incentivize
states to use the indirect rather than the direct route to expropriations. But some governments
reasonably believe that their regulations later determined by a tribunal to be expropriatory are not
so, and FVDE thereby avoids a punitive element. From the perspective of the viability of the
investment regime, limiting compensation to FVDE will reassure host states that their regulatory
actions, even if ultimately found to be expropriatory, are not treated as outright refusals to pay.206
The countervailing concern here is administrability in terms of the tribunal’s ability to
determine the existence of a bona fide disagreement over the expropriatory nature of the
government’s acts. Tribunals would have to discern the seriousness of the host state’s arguments
that it was not expropriating indirectly, even though they have rejected those arguments on the
merits. The tribunal would have to distinguish between obvious indirect expropriations and less
obvious ones. Yet it is certainly possible for tribunals to reach such a conclusion, suggesting that
overall, limiting payment to FVDE for such disagreements is justifiable.
Treating this situation as a bona fide disagreement may, in the end, prove unnecessary to
address host state fears that tribunals will issue large awards for indirect expropriations. For
tribunals have been increasingly wary of claims of such expropriations, adopting a test for the
existence of an expropriation that centers on the loss of control and not merely a diminution of
revenue. 207 And more recent treaties contain a significantly narrower definition of
expropriation.208 Thus, the primary rules seem to be the best site for addressing host state
concerns about too many findings of indirect expropriations.209
C. For Outright Host State Refusal to Pay FVDE, A Choice for the Investor Between FVDE and
FVDA
If a state fails to pay the investor due to a refusal to apply the treaty standard of
compensation, then tribunals should give the investor damages equal to the FVDA, which must
exclude any appreciation that can be traced to the state’s ownership of the investment, with a
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Indeed, some of these arguments might extend to a lower standard of payment for
regulatory takings in all circumstances. For an economic argument to this effect, see Merrill,
supra note 162, at 134–35.
207
See generally Ratner, Regulatory Takings, supra note 140; see also Electrabel v. Hungary,
<8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/07/19, para. 6.62 (Nov. 25, 2015) (“for both direct and indirect
expropriation . . . the requirement under international law [is] for the investor to establish the
substantial, radical, severe, devastating or fundamental deprivation of its rights or the virtual
annihilation, effective neutralisation or factual destruction of its investment, its value or
enjoyment.”).
208
See, e.g., EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 119, ch. 8.2, Art. 16, ann. on “Expropriation.”
209
Tribunals have much more often found some of these regulations to violate the treaty’s
standard of fair and equitable treatment, a point I address later.
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floor of FVDE (plus interest).210 Recall, however, that, in general, FVDA will only differ from
FVDE if the investment performed in a way that could not have been predicted at DE. Although
rarely used in practice, nor conditioned on excluding the state’s contribution to the increased
value of the investment, the choice between FVDE and FVDA is superior to the others in terms of
the five goals of a remedy.
1. It provides the reparation that best matches the harm to the investor. The state has
deprived the investor of the choice to hold the investment, sell it, or invest the proceeds, and the
remedy needs to correct this harm. To do so, it needs to consider the value as of the date of the
award based on information at that date. FVDE is justifiable as the floor because the investor was
guaranteed that amount under the treaty, placing the risk of post-expropriation loss on the state
breaching the treaty; but if the value has increased due to no action by the state, it must pay the
(higher) FVDA.
2. This proposal also places the right incentives on the host state. By shifting the risk of
depreciation of the investment from the investor to the state, and the risk of appreciation from the
state to the investor, it puts a strong incentive on states to carry out their treaty commitments. At
the same time, the state does not pay the investor for the state’s own contribution to the increased
value, mitigating concerns that full value is punitive.
3. The expressive value of the remedy is also enhanced. By requiring the state to pay the
investor potentially more than the FVDE, it imposes a special consequence for ignoring the treaty,
as opposed to simply misinterpreting the compensation requirement. It thereby reasserts the
importance of the duty of compensation. Nonetheless, some host states may still view the
difference between FVDE and FVDA as a form of punishment, especially if the additional amount
is significant (though, as noted, the two numbers will often be the same). It is hard to combat
such perceptions, but it is also important to note that damages above FVDE need not be viewed as
punitive.211 In this case, the state has refused to pay and violated a core obligation of the IIA, so
the better view seems to be that any difference is aimed to address the full harm to the investor
rather than punish the state.
4. With respect to the viability of the legal regime on foreign investment, host state
governments that believe investors win too often, or receive too much, will resist any remedies
that go beyond FVDE (and even FVDE itself). In that sense, it is inferior to applying FVDE in all
situations.212 But the limitation of this remedy to outright refusals to pay is superior to the
alternative of awarding FVDA for any treaty-violative expropriation. Moreover, if tribunals justify
their finding that a nonpayment is due to a refusal by the state and not a bona fide disagreement
covered by the prior proposal, then the imposition of the risk-shifting remedy could sit better
with host states.
5. As for administrability, this remedy is more complex than the other two insofar as it
may require a calculation of FVDA as well as FVDE. But tribunals will only have to engage in that
calculation in a more limited set of cases than under an approach that awards the greater amount
in the event of all treaty-violative expropriations.
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In situations where full reparation requires some amount other than FVDA, e.g., in the case
of a partial expropriation, that amount should be awarded.
211
See Stephan Wittich, Punitive Damages, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 87, at 667, 672.
212
See Quiborax, supra note 1, paras. 56–60, (Stern, dissenting).
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D. A Case-by-Case Approach to Violations of a Treaty’s Process Conditions
A violation of an IIA’s process conditions accompanied by payment of FVDE is unlikely
to lead to litigation, so the likely scenario before a tribunal involves the state’s breach of those
criteria—typically the public purpose and due process requirements (especially the latter)—in
addition to nonpayment. In principle, such a violation seems worse than the refusal to pay in
isolation. Yet if the refusal to pay justifies a remedy of FVDA (with FVDE as a floor) for the
reasons stated in the previous section, what additional damages should be awarded for failure to
meet the process conditions? The five goals suggest that tribunals need flexibility on this issue.
1. Any additional harm to the investor from a violation of the process conditions would
likely involve some sort of process-related mistreatment.213 Yet the sort of harm to the investor
can greatly vary, and so the remedy should not replicate the approach for an outright failure to
pay. Thus, the investor will need to demonstrate the specific harms from these violations to
receive additional damages. One solution might be to award some expenses incurred in opposing
the abuse of process. A more unconventional idea (that would require amending the IIAs) would
be to award additional damages to the investor’s state of nationality. If, for instance, the investor
faced nationality-based discrimination, such discrimination harmed the investor’s state as well.
2. With respect to incentives, an additional amount of damages gives the state an
incentive to follow not merely the compensation requirement but the process conditions. States
have put these criteria into IIAs, and they should not be treated as surplusage. Indeed, they are
listed first in the typical treaty and offer an important measure of protection to the investor and,
indirectly, to the investor’s home state. Moreover, compliance with them can avoid tensions
between the host and home state after an expropriation. Thus, the law should incentivize
compliance with them.
At the same time, if, for some reason, the state pays FVDE but violates the process
conditions, and the investor still decides to sue, these incentives argue against treating a violation
of the process conditions as the same as an outright refusal to pay. Two reasons argue for a more
flexible approach. First, although the host state must meet the process conditions to comply with
the treaty, in reality the payment condition is the most important from the perspective of both the
investor and its home state. Second, given the first goal of tailoring a remedy to the harm to the
investor, and the possibility for a range of harms as noted earlier, incentivizing compliance by
requiring the same remedy as an outright refusal to pay would seem punitive.
3. With regard to the expressive purpose of a remedy, the possibility of additional
damages sends the signal that IIA commitments are not merely about paying investors if they are
expropriated, but about following certain standards in doing so. If the state violates those
standards in addition to refusing the pay, the law is reinforced by an additional remedy.
4. Such a solution, like the prior one, raises concerns in terms of the reaction by losing
parties. To enhance the proposal’s acceptability to host states, tribunals must pay close attention
to the legitimate concerns of host states in expropriating property. Thus, for example, the public
purpose criterion should be broadly interpreted; discrimination should be limited to obviously
invidious grounds; and the due process requirement should not involve importation of the
procedural protections we might expect in a human rights regime. If arbitrators reserve the
finding of process violations to unambiguous situations, then the possibility of additional
213

Although the investor may have been harmed due to these acts by the state, I am not
suggesting that the investor’s human rights have been violated.
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damages may be acceptable to host states.214 In the end, tribunals may choose to refrain from
adding anything to the damages—especially if FVDA turns out to be much higher than FVDE.
5. In terms of administrability, this proposal places a great deal of discretion within
tribunals as to whether to compensate for these violations, and how much. Determining the
separate harm to an investor from the violation of the process conditions may be impossible in
many situations. This challenge again underlines the importance of clear proof by the claimant of
harm from the violation of those criteria.
E. For Situations Other Than Bona Fide Disagreements over Payment, Payment of
Demonstrable Consequential Damages
Lastly, where the state has violated the treaty’s process or payment conditions without
any bona fide disagreement about compensation, then the state should have to pay consequential
damages associated with the violation. These damages, recognized by tribunals and scholars
alike, address the costs incurred by the investor as a result of terminating the investment under
circumstances not provided under the treaty.215 They include costs associated with unanticipated
or abrupt departure of personnel, unexpected transitions to government control or compliance
with new rules, and perhaps even loss of reputation.216 (They do not generally include the legal
costs of the arbitration or domestic remedies.) With respect to the five goals:
1. Consequential damages compensate the investor for unanticipated costs (even if, in
practice, an investor can plan for or even insure against a breach of the treaty by the other side).
At the same time, the investor should incur all the costs associated with an expropriation that is
treaty-compliant, even if it objected to the expropriation. In those situations, the harm to the
investor from the expropriation is, according to the treaty, fully covered by FVDE. As for bona
fide disagreements over the compensation, consequential damages should not be awarded
because the situation seems close to compliance by the host state. Because the state has followed
the process conditions and is committed in principle to paying the FVDE, the investor is incurring
only the expected costs of a treaty-compliant expropriation. If these disagreements include bona
fide disputes over the existence of an expropriation, the state will not have followed all the
process conditions, but on balance the good faith nature of the state’s claim suggests nonpayment
of consequential damages as well.
2. Compensation for consequential damages puts the right incentive on states insofar as
those damages would not be due if the state had followed the IIA. Rather, the investor would
have been expected to pay them. The exception for bona fide disagreements incentivizes good
faith negotiations.

214

I do not regard this as analogous to the manipulation of the primary rules regarding
compensation that I criticized earlier, because in these situations, the text is open-textured
enough to give the tribunal the discretion to avoid finding a violation of the process conditions.
215
See, e.g., Siemens, supra note 62, para. 352; MARBOE, supra note 74, at 304–15
(collecting cases).
216
See, e.g., Siemens, supra note 62, paras. 387–89; Unglaube, supra note 50, para. 307; on
reputation, see Desert Line Projects v. Yemen, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/17, paras. 289–
91 (Feb. 6, 2008) (FET claims) [hereinafter Desert Line]; MARBOE, supra note 74, at 305–08.
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3. Consequential damages serve the expressive purpose of reaffirming the importance of
expropriating only according to the IIA’s procedures. A willingness to pay FVDE should be
treated differently from outright rejection of the treaty’s requirements.
4. Consequential damages might be resisted by host states, but the amounts are not likely
to be so large that they threaten their commitment to the legal regime on foreign investment. In
Siemens, the amount was $9 million compared to $208 million for the FVDA; in Desert Line, it
was one million dollars compared to the roughly $20 million on the main claim.217
5. Lastly, consequential damages are relatively easy for tribunals to assess in that they
typically do not involve complex determinations of market value but rather discrete expenses by
the investor in connection with the treaty-violative expropriation. If the expense cannot be linked
to the state’s taking of the property, then tribunals will not award it.
This five-part proposal thus permits tribunals addressing expropriations to tailor remedies
to the nature and severity of any IIA violations, while avoiding the conceptual confusions of the
lawful/unlawful distinction and that between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans. It does a
better job at advancing the purposes of a remedy than either the treaty standard for all
expropriations or Chorzów Factory’s full reparation standard. Although not unambiguously
superior on all five goals, the proposal is nevertheless on balance clearly superior. We could
even reduce it to three prongs: (1) FVDE for treaty-violative expropriations characterized by a
bona fide disagreement between the parties about the compensation (including over the existence
of an expropriation); (2) the higher of FVDA and FVDE, along with consequential damages, for
refusals by the state to pay compensation; and (3) a case-by-case approach to any damages for
violations of an IIA’s process conditions.
F. Next Steps for Tribunals and Treaty-Drafters
Tribunals adopting this approach, along with the secretariats that help draft their
opinions, will need to make adjustments, both in shedding anachronistic terminology and in
determining consequences for the violations of IIAs. Tribunals should be capable of
distinguishing refusals to pay from nonpayments where the state and investor could not agree on
the FVDE. For the former situations, some tribunals—Siemens, ADC, Yukos, and Quiborax—have
already awarded FVDA, demonstrating that valuation of an investment as of that date is possible.
With regard to violations of the process conditions, tribunals will be in new territory, as they
have not focused on isolating damages due to violation of those criteria alone. Consequential
damages, on the other hand, are remedies with which tribunals already have familiarity.
Will these new determinations by tribunals undercut the overarching goal of a more
predictable and coherent case law? Compared to the current approach, the proposal seems like a
significant improvement. We will have a rubric to connect remedies to the terms of the IIA and a
more transparent framework that clarifies what losses to the investor should be compensated.
Counsel and tribunals can focus on relevant questions about the actions of the host state and their
impact on the investor: Did the state have a bona fide dispute with the investor over payment or
the existence of an expropriation, or did it simply refuse to pay the treaty amount? Did any
violations of the process conditions have an effect on the investor? Did the investor prove any
consequential damages? These questions are more pertinent to remedies and more judicially
217
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manageable than figuring out whether an action was lawful or unlawful as well as what the PCIJ
meant in Chorzów Factory. On the damage calculations, valuation experts will still offer
tribunals divergent figures, but claimants and tribunals can at least work from a generally shared
appreciation of the economic concepts of FVDE and FVDA. That understanding includes the need
to exclude post-expropriation information from the former and include it in the latter, the limited
circumstances in which the two numbers will differ, and the necessity of excluding from FVDA
any unexpected increase in value due to the government’s takeover.
Finally, the approach can be implemented with even greater predictability and authority if
states incorporate it in the treaties themselves. Thus, we could imagine a new provision in IIAs,
after the standard expropriation article, that tells a tribunal what to award when the state
expropriates in a manner inconsistent with each of the four standard requirements. For instance, a
new clause might say, “A state’s failure to pay the amount specified in the fourth criterion [i.e.,
FVDE] due to a bona fide disagreement with the investor [over a defined set of issues] shall not
entitle the investor to damages beyond the FVDE.” Another could note that FVDE must be
calculated, if at all possible, based on information known at DE. And another might say, “A
tribunal may award consequential damages to investors if and only if they can demonstrate the
additional expenditures due to failure to meet the third [due process] requirement.” Along with
reformed case law, any of these clauses would help move toward a true lex specialis for remedies
for IIA violations.218
Yet, as noted earlier, this proposal is not simply transferable to a prescriptive process
addressing a regime with different goals. It may well prove a poor fit for a human rights treaty or
an investment insurance contract. Indeed, two or more states concluding an IIA might decide
among themselves that expropriation should be compensated in yet another way, e.g., FVDE no
matter what the circumstances of the taking.
V.

RELEVANCE FOR VIOLATIONS OF FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT PROVISIONS?

If we look beyond expropriations, the five goals for remedies identified above can also
guide the choice of remedies for other IIA violations. The bulk of claimant victories today center
on violations of the requirement that the state afford the investor fair and equitable treatment
(FET), which treaties and tribunals increasingly define as the minimum standard under
customary international law. As with expropriations, treaties do not specify damages for FET
violations. Instead, tribunals have reflexively cited Chorzów Factory, trying to determine exactly
what harm the FET violation caused the investor (in addition to the major interpretive disputes
about the content of the customary law standard). 219 Some tribunals have analogized FET
violations to expropriations and used the treaty standard of FVDE to assess the damages for an
FET violation.220 This last course of action seems odd insofar as the text nowhere contemplates
FVDE as the damages for an FET violation but only as the compensation for an IIA-compliant
expropriation.
218

For further thoughts, see Rukia Baruti, Available Remedies in Investment Arbitration: Is
There a Need for Explicit Provision in Investment Treaties? <8>OGEMID<8> Virtual Seminar,
supra note 158.
219
See the cases discussed in MARBOE, supra note 74, at 87–88.
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See Wena Hotels, supra note 40, para. 118; CMS, supra note 123, para. 410; see generally
discussion in MARBOE, supra note 74, at 94–96.
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Although a full treatment of the proper formula for FET violations is beyond this study,
the approach above suggests that neither FVDE nor FVDA should represent the exclusive
remedies. FET violations need not deprive the investor of the full value of the investment.
Rather, where an investor has been economically harmed by a violation of FET, but still retains
control of the investment at time X—which may be the date of the award or some point in the
past when it sold the investment—tribunals should adopt a valuation method that identifies the
difference between the value of the investment at time X and the value of the investment at time
X in the absence of the FET violations (what I will call FVx), while insisting that the latter value
be proved with a high degree of certainty.221
The diminution in value approach seems to do well under the first three goals for
remedies. The investor is effectively compensated for what it lost; the state is given a calibrated
incentive to respect the FET provisions (although the tribunal could determine the content of that
standard in a way that would send the wrong incentives to states, e.g., with regard to their
regulatory power); and the treaty’s expressive value is protected.
As for the fourth goal, maintaining the regime’s viability, if the substantive standard for
liability is set at the right level, and the award is calibrated to the difference in value, then in
most cases the award will be short of FVx (or FVDA if the investor still holds the asset at the date
of the award). But in those cases where the investor loses a large portion of the investment’s
value and the asset unexpectedly increases in value (not due to actions by the host state) after the
FET violation, an award approaching FVDA may be a possibility; such an award could meet
significant resistance from host states. Administrability may also be difficult because of the need
to estimate the value of the investment in the absence of the regulatory measures, although
tribunals have claimed to have done this.222
One way to address the fourth concern would be to cap damages at the full value on the
date the FET violation began (plus interest), based on the information known at the time, on the
theory that the host state should never be liable for more than the amount it would have had to
pay the investor if it had totally taken the investment at that point. This approach would
effectively analogize the FET violation to the bona fide disagreement over compensation in the
case of expropriations, where FVDE is the upper limit of damages. Given the significant concerns
of host states that their regulations may lead to investor-state arbitration and violations of the
FET provisions of IIAs, this sort of cap could be useful. But if an FET violation is based on a
deliberate violation of assurances meant to attract the investment in the first place—the standard,
for instance, in Glamis Gold223—the analogy to a bona fide disagreement seems strained, and it
seems more like an outright refusal to pay.
So, as with expropriation, the method used by tribunals needs to be nuanced to the
nature—not merely the existence—of the FET violation. And, as with expropriation, rote
invocation of Chorzów Factory is a way of avoiding that nuance. Instead, tribunals could
develop some principles, analogous to the ones I have developed for expropriations, that would
calibrate damages to the severity of the FET violation, without crossing the line to punishing the
221

For a recent case, see Micula v. Romania, <8>ICSID<8> Case No. ARB/05/20, paras.
944–48 (Dec. 11, 2013) (endorsing this method as flowing from Chorzów Factory).
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See id., paras. 950–1118.
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Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, para. 627 (June 8, 2009); see
also Clayton and Bilcon v. Canada, <8>UNCITRAL<8>, PCA Case No. 2009-4, paras. 445, 589
(Mar. 17, 2015) (reneging on “specific representations” triggers FET violation).
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host state. Because even reneging on assurances given to the investor can come in gradations,
tribunals could take into account more explicitly what a reasonable investor should have
expected in terms of risks, or the reasons the state reneged on its assurances. Good faith or lack
thereof by the state should thus be relevant not merely to the identification of a violation of a
primary rule, but to the damages as well. Consequential damages should be limited to those
expenses completely unforeseeable to the investor. The investor’s conduct should also be a
relevant factor.
These sorts of principles could also be put into treaty text to clarify the factors that a
tribunal may consider in determining damages for FET violations. At a minimum, a treaty could
say that damages shall be limited to proven revenue directly traceable to the FET violation. But
provisions that link the damages to the gravity of the FET violation—not merely whether it fell
short of the Glamis (or other standard), but by how much—could also be helpful, as well as
would a link between the damages and the conduct of the investor.
CONCLUSION
The differentiated approach provides tribunals with a new framework for decisionmaking that better advances the goal of remedies and allows them to tailor the remedy to the
circumstances of expropriations. It takes seriously the decision of states to specify an amount the
host state is obliged to pay in the IIA itself and the practice of many tribunals to award that
amount. It also acknowledges the relevance of the concept of full reparation for treaty breaches
while also moving beyond a simple doctrine—and one old PCIJ case—that does not capture
when full reparation to a foreign investor is warranted. It builds on the distinction that some
tribunals have made between bona fide disagreements over payment and a refusal to pay, as well
as the practice of tribunals to award consequential damages when investors can prove them. In
that sense, it offers a new, but not radical, step for tribunals. At the same time, by introducing
new variables, this approach, whether by a tribunal or in a treaty, has its own risks to
predictability. But given the enormous discretion tribunals already have when working under the
ASRs reparation standard to arrive at a figure for damages, breaking the damages down more
transparently would make for more persuasive awards.
The dissatisfying state of the case law on expropriation remedies, and the possibility for
improvement through the approach offered here, also bring out some of the deeper structure of
the rules of responsibility for violations of IIAs. Both of the status quo approaches—FVDE
always and full reparation always—treat all the state’s duties and violations the same
notwithstanding the overall structure of the typical IIA’s provisions on expropriation. Reparation
through FVDE treats the investor-state relation as if the investor has a limited entitlement that
allows the state to take the property as long as it paid FVDE (similar to a liability rule). And full
reparation treats the investor-state relation as if even a relatively minor deviation from any of the
treaty’s terms is equivalent to a seizure of the investment. A choice between compensation based
on the underlying primary rule—in the IIA—and the secondary rules—in the ILC’s ASRs—
leaves tribunals with a narrow range of legal positions for remedies, even if they may exercise a
great deal of discretion in coming up with the final number.
The differentiated approach thus offers a challenge to the separation of primary and
secondary rules that has become accepted since the issuance of the ILC’s ASRs. Though the
ASRs do not rule out that each treaty or specialized regime can have its own rules on the
consequences of a state’s responsibility, the separation has limited the options for remedies.
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Investment law has not developed its own rules, and certainly not any sensitive to the primary
rule that has been violated. The approach I offer links investor rights/state duties and remedies
more directly, which is a particularly important for a regime under a barrage of criticism from
both states and nonstate actors. For a relatively new area of international law to maintain its
acceptability to this range of global participants, it needs to develop more nimble doctrines.
Human rights law shows an alternative path, as it has evolved through new tools such as a
recognition of the state’s duties to protect against private violators, the margin of appreciation,
and the acceptance of nonpecuniary damages.
In the end, the choice for states, and tribunals, is whether to rely on Chorzów Factory and
the ASRs as the Α and Ω—chronologically and metaphorically—for damages calculations, or
whether to develop an alternative more attuned the reality of expropriations and other IIA
actually as well as the goal of remedies. International investment law has now matured, as it
were, so that we ought to be able to do better, either in case law or treaty text, in calibrating
compensation to violations. It is time for a true lex specialis that makes clear to all the
participants in the international investment law process the consequences if a host state—or a
foreign investor—breaches its commitments under an IIA.
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